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1 Introduction
Due to the real-time nature and the importance of industrial processes, the re-
mote operation of them is a requirement by many organizations. However, the
ubiquity of Internet access is leading to an increment on the number of connec-
tions, reaching loads that SCADA servers may not be prepared to manage. A
middle layer of access servers can be used to manage this connection load and
forward the petitions to their nal destination server(s).
Nevertheless, with the presence of a middle layer, authentication node-to-node
does not guarantee authenticity and non-repudiation of the commands received
at the SCADA server. Should one of the middle servers be compromised, the
authentication they provide would not be trustworthy. Thus, this thesis intends
to nd a solution that guarantees end-to-end authentication, even in the event
of access server compromise.
1.1 Problem Description
Operators may need remote access to SCADA1 systems to check their status
or run commands. In order to provide scalability and exibility, a middle layer
of access servers can be used to forward the petitions to the SCADA servers,
reducing the number of direct connections to them.
This layer of access servers also provides a means of transparently redirect op-
erator petitions to additional servers (e.g. historian server), leaving room for
extending system functionalities without modications on operator applications.
Moreover, complex commands may need actions to be performed in several
SCADA servers. Access servers can receive a single request from an user and
translate it into several commands to be send to various SCADA servers.
Nevertheless, when this middle layer between the SCADA server and the opera-
tor is in place, new challenges arise. Authentication of users and accountability
of their actions become a more complex issue. Particularly, there is a need for
the SCADA server to know who initiated each command. At the same time,
the access server needs to know if the user is authenticated for performing the
requested action, to decide whether it should forward the request to the SCADA
server.
In addition, the complexity should not be handed over to the user (i.e. they
should not need to log in twice), but the system must manage the double au-
thentication transparently. Finally, SCADA systems have some requirements in
terms of latency and protocol compatibility that should be considered.
1.2 Objectives
This project aims to provide a method for securing the access to the SCADA
servers through a middle layer, ensuring authentication and accountability at
each step of the communication. To this eect, several solutions will be explored
1SCADA: Computer based system architecture for management and supervision of in-
dustrial processes.
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and evaluated in terms of security, cost, complexity and compatibility with an
existing deployment at ABB.
Moreover, the prototype implementation of the proposed design is also to be
delivered by this thesis. It aims to prove the validity and suitability of the
design and to provide a test bed for running a limited performance evaluation
of the solution.
1.3 Research Question
This Master thesis aims to answer the following research question:
What is the best method to provide authentication and accountabil-
ity on the communication between a SCADA server and a remote
operator when an access server is in the middle?
Two aspects of this question are to be considered:
 Theoretical view: Which option better satises the requirements and oers
a higher level of security.
 Practical view: Which option that meets the requirements is the best in
terms of cost, latency and compatibility with the existing set up.
1.4 Delimitations and scope
The main focus of this thesis lies in dening the design of a solution that ad-
dresses the research problem (x1.1), while achieving the objectives (x1.2). Thus,
the design must be targeted to ABB's architecture and requirements.
However, architecture parameters vary from one ABB client to another. Thus,
a concrete set of requirements must be established, agreeing with ABB in the
general characteristics of their client's architectures. Having a concrete set of
requirements may limit the compatibility of our design to a subset of all ABB's
client architectures, but is needed for delimiting the thesis work.
Moreover, our prototype implementation is not generated to be deployed in
production environments, but for proving the validity of the design and as test
bed for the performance evaluation. Therefore, the main focus is to be able to
sign and verify messages, using the Active Directory for credential management.
The actual message exchange between nodes depends on several ABB RPC
protocols and is not necessary for the objectives of this Master thesis that the
implementation supports them. It is sucient to use a means of communication
that is compatible with these protocols (i.e. text-base communication) to ensure
that our design can be implemented on top of them.
1.5 Contributions
The main contribution of this Master thesis is a design that provides the best
solution for securing the communication between SCADA servers and operators
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through a middle layer, considering the particular requirements of the target
architecture.
Moreover, the analysis of several solutions prior to the design proposal has value
in its own, since it proposes several valid solutions to the problem that may be
more suitable than the selected one for dierent target architectures.
In addition, a prototype implementation and a limited performance evaluation
is also provided, facilitating the implementation of the solution in production
environments.
Furthermore, we dene how to use the Active Directory for storing public keys.
This aspect of the implementation is valuable on its own, as it can be used for
storing public keys in other architectures and with dierent purposes.
1.6 Thesis outline
This thesis report is organized in the following chapters:
1. Introduction: This chapter introduces the topic of this thesis by dening
the problem and how is addressed.
2. Theoretical foundation: It introduces several theoretical concepts that
this Master thesis builds upon.
3. Background: It extends the theoretical foundation by covering a set of
denitions that are especially relevant for this thesis work.
4. Methodology: It discusses about the methodology followed for produc-
ing this Master thesis.
5. Requirements: It establishes the requirements that the solution to be
proposed by this thesis must full.
6. Analysis: It discusses the possible designs that would full the previously
established requirements.
7. Design: It provides a detailed description of the selected solution.
8. Implementation: It describes the creation of a prototype implementa-
tion of the design
9. Performance evaluation: It covers the results of a limited performance
evaluation of the implementation.
10. Discussion: It explains how the thesis requirements are met in terms of
compatibility with the target architecture, security and performance.
11. Conclusion: It reects about the level of fullment of the thesis objective
and proposes potential extensions.
3
2 Theoretical foundation
This chapter introduces several theoretical concepts that this Master thesis
builds upon. Thus, it reects the research that supports the rest of the chapters
and provides a means for understating the thesis to the readers.
2.1 Authentication
In computing, authentication is the process that ensures that an entity is who it
claims to be. When a user sends messages or accesses a resource, authentication
guarantees that their identity is veried. This process is needed, not only for
guaranteeing the validity of the user's identication, but also for supporting
other security related processes. Namely, authorization and non-repudiation.
Users' identities should be veried before deciding which permissions they have
or to have a reliable record of their accesses to the system.
2.2 Non-repudiation
Non-repudiation in electronic transactions refers to the impossibility for the
involved parties to deny their participation. For the target architecture, the
focus is on the user actions. The SCADA server needs to guarantee that when
an user issues a command, the action is registered and the user cannot deny
having sent that command to the server. Thus, in our context, non-repudiation
has the same eect as accountability. Providing the system guarantees user
authentication, if it ensures accountability (i.e. it records user identities and
their actions) it also ensures non-repudiation (i.e. the user cannot deny issuing
a command).
2.3 Symmetric-key and Public-key cryptography
Modern cryptographic algorithms can be classied in two groups, depending on
the type of encryption algorithms they use. Symmetric key cryptography relies
on one key that is used for encrypting and decrypting messages, as shown in
Figure 1. Therefore, anyone with the secret key can perform encryption and
decryption operations.
On the other hand, when asymmetric or public key encryption is in place, each
entity has two keys: a public and a private one. Messages are encrypted with
the public key of the recipient who decrypts them with their private key. The
public key is used for encrypting messages and the private key for decrypting
them. The process is show in Figure 2
However, public key encryption algorithms have a higher computational cost
than symmetric ones. Mainly because their keys are longer. They need a greater
protection against brute-force attacks, since public keys are expected to be more
exposed than symmetric keys. Thus, symmetric keys are typically used for
perform bulk encryption operations, while public-key based algorithms provide
a secure method for exchange symmetric keys, which are typically temporary
for a communication session.
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Figure 1: Symmetric-key encryption [1]
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Figure 2: Asymmetric-key encryption [2]
Table 1: RSA key generation
Step Algorithm Example
1 Select p and q, both prime and p 6= q p = 17 and q = 13
2 Obtain n: n = p  q n = 17  13 = 221
3 Obtain (n): (n) = (p  1)  (q   1) (n) = (17  1)  (13  1) = 192
4 Obtain e: gcd((n); e) = 1; 1 < e < (n) e = 11; gcd(192; 11) = 1; 1 < 11 < 192
5 Obtain d: d  e mod (n) = 1 d = 35; 35  11 mod 192 = 1
6 Public Key: PU = fe; ng PU = f11; 221g
7 Private key: PV = fd; ng PV = f35; 221g
2.4 Public-key algorithms
2.4.1 RSA
Rivest, Shamir and Adleman (RSA) is the most widely used asymmetric key
algorithm [9]. Its design is based on the unproven assumption that the factor-
ization of the product of two large prime numbers is too dicult to be done in a
practical period of time. The key generation process of RSA is show in Table 1.
Moreover, as presented in Table 2, RSA supports both encryption and digital
signature operations, depending on how the keys are used.
2.4.2 ECDSA
Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) is a digital signature standard dened by
the US National Institute of Standards and Technology [10]. Unlike RSA, it
Table 2: RSA Key encryption and decryption.2
Action Typical usage Algorithm
Encryption
Public Key Condentiality: message encryption C = Me mod n
Private Key Authentication: signing SM = Md mod n
Decryption
Public Key Authentication: signature verication M = SMe mod n
Private Key Condentiality: message decryption M = Cd mod n
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does not support encryption operations. Moreover, its design lies on discrete
logarithms and how dicult they are to compute, compared to their inverse
operation, the discrete exponentiation. As for RSA, this assumption is not
proven.
Discrete logarithm cryptography can be divided into nite eld cryptography,
the one used by DSA, and elliptic curve cryptography. The latter is used by
Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA), an algorithm that is re-
placing DSA at several organizations. In fact, the NSA (US National Security
Agency) does not recommend DSA anymore, but they suggest relying on RSA
or ECDSA [11] for digital signatures. The main advantage of ECDSA, when
compared to DSA and also to RSA, is that it provides the same level of security
using shorter key lengths.
An elliptic curve is a set of points dened over a nite eld Fq. An specic curve
E is the set of solutions to its short Weierstrass equation.
If Fq is a prime eld (Zp), E is dened by [12]
E(Fq) = E(Zp) =

(x; y) 2 Z2p j y2 = x3 + ay + b
	
;
where (a; b) 2 Zp and 4a3 + 27b2 6= 0.
However, when Fq is a binary eld, the equation that denes E is [12]
E(Fq) = E(F2l) =

(x; y) 2 F22l j y2 + xy = x3 + ax2 + b
	
;
where (a; b) 2 F2l , b 6= 0 and 2l is a power of 2.
Key generation ECDSA keys are relative to a particular elliptic curve, de-
ned by the following public parameters (sP represents an elliptic curve point
P multiplied by an scalar s) [13]:
 q, the cardinality of the curve eld, Fq
 a and b, two eld elements
 n, being n prime and n > 2160
 G, an element of the elliptic curve of order n (nG = 0)
With these parameters, the key pair can be generated. The private key is a
random integer d 2 [1; n  1]. The public key is dG.
Signing As with RSA or DSA, signature operations are done using the hash
of the document, H(M). The particular steps for generating a signature from
the document hash are detailed below [13]:
1. Select k, a random integer. k 2 [1; n  1].
2. Obtain a curve point: (x1; y1) = kG
2C=Ciphertext; M = Plaintext; SM = Signed message
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Table 3: Comparison of key sizes: Asymmetric (RSA and ECC) and symmetric.
Based on to two publications [5][6].
Security (bits) Symmetric
Asymmetric [5] Asymmetric [6]
RSA ECC RSA ECC
112 3TDEA 2048 224-255 2432 224
128 AES-128 3072 256-383 3248 256
192 AES-192 7680 384-511 7936 384
256 AES-256 15360  512 15424 512
3. r = x1 mod n. If r = 0 go back to 1.
4. s = H(M)+drk mod n. If s = 0 go back to 1.
5. The signature of message M is (r; s).
Signature verication Finally, when the recipient obtains the signed mes-
sage, they need to verify the signature to ensure the integrity of the message
(i.e. it was not modied in transit) and to authenticate the sender to be the
owner of the public key, ensuring that the following conditions are true [13]:
 Q 6= 0, Q 2 C and nQ = 0
 r; s 2 [1; n  1]
 r = x1 mod n for:
(x1; y1) = u1 G+ u2 Q
u1 =
H(M)
s
u2 =
r
s mod n
2.4.3 Performance of RSA and ECDSA
The performance of any cryptographic algorithm varies according to its key
size. Greater key sizes usually imply more complex operations and a resulting
increase on the computation time for any cryptographic operations. This is
generally true for RSA and for Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC). However,
with ECC, the particular choice of curve can lead to greater key lengths being
faster. For instance, both signing and signature verication operations are faster
with the NIST P-256 (256 bits) curve than with the NIST P-224 (224 bits) [7].
Moreover, any performance analysis must acknowledge that ECC (and thus
ECDSA) provides the same level of security with smaller key sizes, as Table 3
shows.
Table 4 shows the number of cycles for digital signature related operations
depending on the algorithm and key-size. As previously stated, the NIST P-224
curve oers worse performance that the NIST P-256 while providing a lower
level of security. Thus, for ECDSA, only the 256 bits curve is considered, and
compared with RSA 3072 (equivalent) and RSA 2048.
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Table 4: Performance comparison of asymmetric signature algorithms. Values
are the median of the results of several executions, expressed in thousands of
processor cycles [7]. A star indicates unreliable results (high variance). Imple-
mentation notes at [8].
Primitive Key generation Signing (56 bytes) Verication (56 bytes)
ECDSA NIST P-256 493 163 311
RSA 2048-bit 167120* 3363 51
RSA 3072-bit 576112* 8518 85
According to those benchmarks (on Table 4), key generation is 3 orders of
magnitude faster for ECDSA than for RSA. Theory supports this result. RSA
key generation includes the lookup of large prime numbers. There are known
processes for doing so, but they are computational expensive.
On the other hand, ECC relies on a set of pre-established parameters for dening
the curve. The generation of they key pair only needs the generation of a random
number (the private key) and obtaining a point on the curve by multiplication.
As a result RSA key generation times grow exponentially, while with ECDSA
the increment is linear in relation with key size [14].
Moreover, in terms of signature generation, ECDSA is one order of magnitude
faster than RSA. The reason behind this dierence is that ECDSA signing relies
on the Extended Euclidean Algorithm, which is more computationally ecient
that the exponentiation needed by RSA [15]. Results from other performance
studies support this consideration [16][17]. Other analysts report dierences
only for big key sizes [14].
Finally, signature verication is 1 order of magnitude faster when using RSA
than with ECDSA. The theoretical explanation is that RSA only needs one
exponentiation operation for verifying a signature, while ECDSA needs two.
This fact is supported by several performance studies [16][17][14].
2.4.4 Security of RSA and ECDSA
Both ECDSA and RSA provide a great level of security, providing that keys are
long enough. The United States National Security Agency (NSA), establishes
RSA as suitable for TOP SECRET systems as long as keys are at least 3072 bit
long. For ECDSA, they require 384-bit keys, recommending the NIST-P-384
curve [11].
The ECRYPT group has similar recommendations. According to the them, RSA
2048-bit and ECDSA 224-bit are suitable for medium term protection while long
term protection can be guaranteed with RSA 3072-bit or ECDSA 256-bit [6].
In general, any public key algorithm must rely on a one-way function. It must
be impossible to obtain the private key or simulate its ownership, even if the
public key is known.
As stated before, RSA guarantees this property by using prime number fac-
torization, while ECDSA or DSA are based on the discrete logarithm problem.
Both operations are supposed to be too computationally expensive to revert
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when key lengths are sucient, but this theory is not proven.
Moreover, quantum computing could be able to break both RSA or ECDSA.
In 1999, Peter W. Shor [18] presented an algorithm to solve both prime factor-
ization and discrete logarithms on a quantum computer in polynomial times.
However, no organization or individual has acknowledged having broken RSA
or ECDSA using quantum computing.
There are other public-key cryptography algorithms that are supposed to be
resilient to quantum computing, such as Lattice-based or hash-based cryptog-
raphy [19], but they are not widely used or standardised [11].
RSA vulnerabilities Due to its wide use and deployment, RSA has been
extensively tested. There are optimizations that can solve the factorization
problem in shorter periods of times. The longer RSA key that has been broken is
a 768-bit one. The researchers needed several years to accomplish this milestone.
Consequently, they recommended using RSA keys longer that 1024 bits [20].
Moreover, other attacks against RSA have focused on implementation problems.
For instance, vulnerabilities in the pseudo-random number generators [21] or
defective key generation (p and q values being to close) [22]. In addition, side
channel analysis attacks are also possible. For example, time based attacks that
rely on the knowledge of the victim's hardware [23].
ECDSA vulnerabilities The main disadvantage of ECDSA in relation with
RSA is its more recent deployment. Even though ECDSA is becoming to be
widely used, its implementations have not been as thoroughly tested as RSA
ones. As a result, the likeliness of undiscovered or undisclosed vulnerabilities is
arguably higher. Moreover, ECDSA is more dicult to implement [24], which
makes harder for developers to evaluate existing implementations and new ones
more bug prone.
As for RSA, ECDSA implementations could be faulty and have vulnerabilities.
One important parameter of ECDSA (and classic DSA) is k. If its value is
repeated along several uses of the private key, and attacker could be able to
obtain the key. As a result, k should be a nonce (only used once) and its
generation unpredictable and secret [25][26]. One alternative for guaranteeing
that k is unique and unpredictable is to deterministically generate it based on
the private key and the message hash, as described in RFC 6979 [27].
In addition, the selection of a particular curve can have security implications.
Some curves are considered insecure, since they reduce the computational cost of
the related discrete logarithm operation [28]. A solution to this potential aw is
using known curves. The most commonly used ones are the curves standardised
by the United States National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST).
However, it should be noted that some cryptography experts argue that these
curves are not completely secure. They support this allegation on the use of
unexplained seeds for generating coecients [29].
Finally, attackers could also benet from knowledge or access to the victim's
system to perform side-channel attacks, in a similar manner as it has been done
for RSA. These attacks could even be performed remotely, through a network
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service [30].
2.4.5 Cryptographic hash functions
A hash functions map data of an arbitrary length to a xed length data block.
They are a digest of the data, typically used to ensure its integrity.
Hash functions are commonly used in cryptography. However, not any hash
function is valid for this application. Cryptographic hash functions are those
that are suitable for cryptographic operations. They have the following charac-
teristics [9]:
 Deterministic: One input data block must always provide the same digest.
 They accept any input length.
 The output has a xed length.
 The generation of the hash of a data block, H(x), does not incur in high
computational costs.
 One-way or preimage resistant: It is not computationally possible to re-
cover a message m from its hash H(m).
 Weak collision resistant: For a given data block x it is not computationally
possible to nd y such that H(y) = H(x) and x 6= y.
 Strong collision resistant: It is not computationally possible to nd a two
data blocks (x; y) such that H(y) = H(x) and x 6= y.
2.5 Cryptographic solutions for authentication and non-
repudiation
2.5.1 Digital signatures
Digital signatures are the most common cryptographic solution for ensuring
authentication and non-repudiation. They are based on asymmetric key en-
cryption and they also guarantee the integrity of the transmitted data. Any of
the previously mentioned public-key algorithms (RSA, DSA or ECDSA) can be
use for implementing digital signature architectures.
Digital signature schemes allow a signer S who has established a
public key pk to "sign" a message in such a way that any other party
who knows pk (and knows that this public key was established by
S) can verify that the message originated from S and has not been
modied in any way. [31]
When digitally signing a document or a message, the related cryptographic
operation is not performed on the actual content to be signed, but on a digest
of it. By doing so, the related computational costs decrease, together with the
size of the signature. Moreover, a digest of the data provides a summary of its
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contents in a standard format, simplifying the implementation of the signature.
It also removes the need for signing several blocks when the input is longer than
the block size.
The digest of the data needed for digital signatures must be done using crypto-
graphic hash functions. Using a secure hash function ensures that the signature
is valid for the messaged whose hash was signed.
MD5 and the SHA family have been the most common secure hash functions.
However, MD5 and the initial versions of SHA (SHA-0 and SHA-1) are no longer
considered secure [32][33]. The dierent versions of SHA-2 are the current NIST
standard for digital signatures and they are currently working on SHA-3 [34].
They particularly recommend using SHA-2 hashes of at least 256 bit (SHA-256)
or switching to SHA-3 [35]. The NSA requirements are higher, their advice is
to use SHA-384 [11].
Digital signature security Digital signature security is dependant on the
algorithms used for implementing it. As stated before, public key algorithms
security typically depends on mathematical problems that are allegedly imprac-
tical to solve. Moreover, faulty implementations of these algorithms or of the
digital signature process itself could lead to vulnerabilities.
Furthermore, public key authentication relies on the use of certicates, which
are issued by a Certication Authority (CA), that manages a Public Key In-
frastructure (PKI) environment. As a result, if the CA was compromised, an
attacker would be able to impersonate any user by creating fake certicates.
Moreover, PKI environments are primarily stateless. The certicate is the main
source of trust. Thus, if an attacker managed to obtain a legitimate certicate,
they would be able to impersonate the owner.
For addressing the risk of stolen credentials, certicates have expiration dates
and deployments can support the revocation of certicates. Revocation is pro-
vided by Certicate Revocation Lists (CRLs), a list of revoked certicates that
should be periodically fetched from the CA, or by using the Online Certicate
Status Protocol (OCSP), a protocol to verify with the CA the validity of a
particular certicate. The latter provides a faster revocation, since certicates
are veried on demand, but it also imposes an increment in latency for each
certicate verication that CRLs do not.
2.5.2 Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC)
A Message Authentication Code (MAC) is a ngerprint of a message used to
authenticate its origin, protecting data integrity and authenticity. In contrast
with digital signatures, MACs are generated and veried using the same key.
One common implementation of MAC is HMAC, which uses a secret key and a
hashing algorithm for generating the MAC. It is dened in RFC 2104 [36] as
HMAC(K;m) = H
 
K  opadkH(K  ipadkm)
where K is the key, m is the message, H(x) is the hash digest of x, opad and
ipad are padding values,  is an XOR operation and k is a byte concatenation
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operation.
Using an HMAC implementation provides exibility since it can be used re-
gardless of the underneath hashing algorithm. In addition, it provides a higher
degree of security than more simple options such as H(Kkm), H(mkK) or even
H(KkmkK), vulnerable to extension or collision attacks [37].
Security of HMAC is highly dependant on the length of the secret key, since
it makes the digest vulnerable to brute force attacks, which when successful
would provide the secret key to an attacker. On the other hand, collisions are
not as critical as with digital signatures (the implementation was designed to
mitigate their eect). Therefore, MD5 or SHA1 collision attacks do not seriously
aect HMAC. However, more secure hash functions (at least SHA-256) should
be used whenever possible, as recommended by the informational RFC 6151 [38]
and NIST [35].
2.5.3 Symmetric key based solutions
The sole use of symmetric-key cryptography does not provide full authentica-
tion as is. In any pure symmetric-key protected communication, the key must
be known at least by the parties who are involved. As a result, it can only
unequivocally identify a sender if the recipient is fully trusted. Moreover, pure
symmetric-key authentication is not manageable, since, to ensure security, each
client would need to have a dierent key for each principal they want to com-
municate with.
In order to address this limitation, the use of authentication servers is needed.
An authentication server is a trusted party that authenticates all the nodes
involved in a electronic transaction by using symmetric-key cryptography and
provides the tools for them to authenticate against each other. The most com-
mon protocol to perform these operations is Kerberos.
Kerberos protocol main functionality is the verication of principals (e.g. users
or servers) on an insecure network. It does not depend on physical security, host
addresses (e.g. IP addresses) or host operating systems, and eavesdropping of
the packets sent through the network is assumed. [39]. A simplied description
of the authentication process is included bellow:
1. A client requests credentials for a particular server to the Authentication
Server (AS)
2. The server response includes a ticket for the server and a (temporary)
session key, encrypted with the client's (symmetric) key.
3. The client sends the ticket3 to the server
4. Upon reception of the ticket, both the server and the client have the session
key, which proves their identities were veried by the AS.
Typically, the process is more complex. The AS does not send a client-to-
server ticket directly, but a Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT), which has a similar
3A client-to-server ticket is formed by the client's identity and the session key, and en-
crypted with the server's key
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structure. With the TGT, the client can request client-to-server tickets during
a certain time period. Requests are sent to the Ticket Granting Server (TGS),
which can be hosted by the same machine as the AS or by another one, providing
scalability. The process is described in Figure 3.
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Figure 3: Kerberos authentication process [3]
Kerberos security Kerberos protocol security relies on the use of tickets and
on the trust in the authentication server. Being security mainly based on tickets,
means that Kerberos deployments have an inherent stateless functioning. Thus,
tickets are portable, contain all the policy information and their protection must
be a priority for any Kerberos implementation.
As a result, ticket encryption is not done directly with the account password,
but with a derived key, from which the password cannot be recovered. Using
derived keys makes harder for attackers to obtain the account password.
According to the Kerberos standard, keys should be created using a one-way
function [39][40]. This (hash) function should not only receive the password,
but also extra data (e.g. username and domain). Passing this data to the hash
function avoids that users with the same password have the same derived keys.
However, Microsoft implementation used to ignore this standard requirement, by
using Microsoft NT LAN Manager (NTLM) hashes directly to encrypt Kerberos
tickets. NTLM hashes only have the user's password as input, and in NTLMv2
they are created using MD4, a protocol known for not being collision resistant
[41]. This aw was xed in most recent Microsoft's implementations [42], that
use AES-128 or AES-256 as the preferred encryption algorithms and whose key
material includes not only the password but also the the user name and the
DNS realm.
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Typical attacks to the Kerberos protocol As stated previously, Kerberos
security is primarily based on the use of tickets. Thus, most attacks try to
target them, being therefore able to impersonate legitimate users. A summary
of most common attacks against Kerberos protocol is shown below:
 Overpass-the-hash If attackers got their hands on the hash of an user
account (e.g. from memory, by cracking a ticket), they would be able
to request the Key Distribution Center (KDC) valid tickets for that user,
thus being able to impersonate them [43]. This attack can be mitigated by
using the latest Microsoft Kerberos implementation, that, as stated before,
provides higher security in terms of password hashing and management.
{ Golden ticket If an attacker obtained the KRBTGT password (the
one that encrypts TGTs) or related hashes, they would be able to
create as many tickets as they want, impersonating any user, and
freely establishing policy parameters. Moreover, KRBTGT pass-
word is hardly ever renewed in most organizations (it could cause
signicant disruptions, due to legitimate tickets becoming invalid),
providing the attacker with nearly full access to the domain for a
long period of time.
{ Silver ticket A limited version of the golden ticket. It can be created
by an attacker who is able to extract the password or hash of the
account that encrypts TGSs. It would also provide unlimited access
but only to a particular service (the one whose key or hash was
leaked).
 Pass-the-ticket Windows does not allow extracting Kerberos tickets from
a particular machine, but there are tools that perform this operation,
providing the intruder has enough privileges [44]. If an attacker extracts a
ticket, they can use it on another machine, being able to impersonate the
owner until the ticket expires. If the ticket was a TGT, it would provide
access to every service on the domain. On the other hand, service tickets
only provide access to a particular service.
Kerberos proxiable tickets By default, tickets are granted to a node, as
long as it is managed by the principal they claim to represent. However, when
more exibility is needed, proxiable tickets may be used. According to the
Kerberos standard [39], when a client sends a ticket with the PROXIABLE ag
enabled to a server, the server can send it to the TGS to request a new client-
to-server ticket. The TGS will the return a ticket based on the received one
that allows the server to access the service as if it were the client. These tickets
must specify the network address from which they can be used (i.e. the server
address), reducing the attackers' ability to stole credentials.
In Active Directory, Microsoft Windows directory service, proxiable tickets are
included in a functionality called Kerberos delegation [45]. It provides means
for authorized servers to be able to authenticate on behalf of their clients. It is
not mandatory, but limiting the server's ability to impersonate users to partic-
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ular services can be done on a per service user4 basis.
4service user: User account that does not represent a user, but a service; providing a
security context for the service execution.
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3 Background
The background chapter extends the theoretical foundation by covering a set
of denitions that are especially relevant for this thesis work. Particularly, it
provides a generalised view of the characteristics of the target architecture and
of the problem that this thesis is addressing.
3.1 Industrial Control Systems
Industrial Control System (ICS) is a term that includes a wide range of control
systems, used for controlling industrial processes. They are found in most in-
dustry sectors (e.g. electrical, water, oil, chemical, transportation...) and they
commonly control critical infrastructures [46].
They simplify process control by translating operators' commands into actions
on physical components and/or by providing an interface for accessing data
generated by those components.
Since ICSs support industrial processes in critical infrastructures, their protec-
tion is a priority. In fact, there are standards in several countries that dene
the security measures required by law for protecting ICSs [46].
Nevertheless, even when industrial processes controlled by ICS cannot be con-
sidered of critical nature, their protection is also important. Not only due to
the economical consequences of the disruption in any industrial operation, but
also because of their safety implications. As previously stated, commands to
ICSs produce actions on physical components. Thus, their protection is not
only a security matter, as with traditional computing. Attacks on ICSs can also
produce safety hazards, including life-threatening situations.
ICSs rely on eld controllers in order collect data and perform physical action
on the controlled processes. Depending on how they interact with the phys-
ical components and their functionality on the whole ICS infrastructure, ICS
controllers can be classied in three main categories [47]:
 Programmable Logical Controllers (PLCs) run programmed instruc-
tions depending on the readings from the sensors and the orders of the
controllers, moving actuators or changing switch settings. They are de-
signed to withstand dicult environmental conditions and can be deployed
for long periods of time (more than 10 years).
 Remote Terminal Units (RTUs) are electronic devices controlled by a
microprocessor. They are remotely managed, providing data to the control
centre, which can issue commands to RTUs to be performed on the phys-
ical processes. Their dierences from PLCs are dicult to dene, since
RTUs are implementing functionalities typically found in PLCs. However,
it is common that RTUs are located in remote areas, far from the control
centre and potentially using Wide Area Network (WAN) protocols. On
the other hand, PLCs usually control processes in factories, where the
control centre is in the same building or area and local networks can be
used for communication.
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 Intelligent Electronic Devices (IEDs) devices are and advanced vari-
ation of PLCs. Just as them, they can perform programmed control op-
erations, based on the data from the sensors they manage. However, in
contrast with PLCs, IEDs are able to control dierent aspects of each
equipment piece, consequently oering superior control functionalities.
Particularly, they provide protection, control, monitoring, metering and
communication.
ICS supervisory systems can be classied depending on their functionalities and
on the nature of the separation between them and the eld components. A list
of most common ICS types is included below [47]:
 Building Automation Systems (BASs) control and monitor the ser-
vices present in a building (e.g. security, power, heating, re protection...).
 Safety Instrumented Systems (SISs) monitor industrial processes to
prevent safety hazards, by taking systems to a safe state should pre-
established conditions are violated. [48]
 Process Control Systems (PCSs) control the automation of one man-
ufacturing process at one site
 Distributed Control Systems (DCSs) control several automation pro-
cesses at one site. They may monitor several PCSs, or the automation of
a whole plant.
 Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems pro-
vide an operator in a remote location information about the state of an
automation process and the ability to issue commands to modify the state
of the that process [49]. They are similar to DCSs, but they are able
to control remote processes that are potentially distributed across a wide
geographical area.
{ Energy Management System (EMS) is an specic type of SCADA
system designed for managing the generation and distribution of elec-
tricity in a national or even international scale.
3.2 SCADA constrains
When compared to traditional IT systems, SCADA systems have particular
characteristics that must be considered for designing an architecture that in-
cludes them. They aect the likelihood of vulnerabilities being present on those
systems and add computational limitations and potential compatibility issues
that may aect any new deployment.
SCADA systems control real-time industrial process. Therefore, when an oper-
ator uses them, they should be able to see real-time data of the current state of
the eld components. The eect of delays in SCADA systems has been analysed
by several researchers. For instance, J. Luque et al. proposed an analytic model
for studying it [50].
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Delayed data could lead to improper responses by the operator, based on infor-
mation that is not longer valid (i.e. the current state of the system is dierent
to the one they are shown). Similarly, the system would be negatively aected
if user commands were delayed, even when sensor data arrives in real time to
the operator.
Therefore, latency is an important performance measurement in SCADA sys-
tems. Maintaining a low latency can avoid delay-related errors, aiding in reach-
ing a good service level in the whole SCADA-managed infrastructure.
In general, it is common that SCADA systems are deployed on old and out-of-
date equipment. Upgrading is commonly faster in traditional IT systems than in
industrial control systems [51]. Particularly, it is common that SCADA software
runs on old devices, since replacing them would likely disrupt the processes
under supervision. For the same reason, patches and updates are not applied
as fast as in traditional systems.
Using legacy equipment and software can lead un-patched vulnerabilities and
limited performance. As a result it is important to consider the possible presence
of legacy equipment and its consequences when designing for SCADA-related
infrastructures.
Moreover, in any microprocessor, software processes ght for computational
resources, particularly CPU time. Since no system has endless resources, the
more processes there are, the less CPU time each one has. Resource limitations
have a potentially signicant impact in industrial control systems.
If a process did not have timely access to the computational resources it needs,
the service(s) it provides would be potentially delayed, aecting the latency of
the system. Legacy systems are potentially more sensitive to CPU overuse, since
they are typically more resource-constrained. Moreover, even when resources
are enough, the use of CPU aects power consumption. Higher CPU usages
cause higher microprocessor and heat-dissipation energy utilization, which ends
in increased costs for the owner of the system.
As a result, due to the likely present of legacy systems, the criticality of in-
dustrial processes and the potential power-consumption cost impact, a design
targeted to a SCADA architecture must consider the CPU usage as an important
benchmark for evaluating its suitability.
Furthermore, many countries have regulations regarding SCADA systems and
their security. Therefore, when applying any modication to SCADA infras-
tructures, the fullment of requirements established by ICS regulations must be
kept.
Finally, in contrast with traditional IT systems, industrial control systems inter-
act with the physical world. Thus, the consequences of attacks against SCADA
systems could cause safety hazards, and even lead to life-threatening situations.
In other words, SCADA systems protection is not only a matter of security, but
also of safety.
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3.3 SCADA security procedures
Industrial Control systems are typically more slowly updated than traditional IT
systems [51]. One of the reasons behind this backwardness is the consideration of
availability as a top prioirity for ICSs, since any disruption can have economical
and even environmental or safety consequences. Moreover, ICS systems used
to be isolated from external networks, creating a thoughtless overcondence on
the system resistance against attacks that minimized the perceived importance
of security updates.
However, in order to improve automation processes, new functionalities need
to be implemented. Organizations developed high-level control systems based
on traditional IT, that where afterwards integrated with existing automation
infrastructure. Thus is becoming more common that corporate and industrial
networks are integrated, providing more functionalities, but increasing the at-
tack surface and making the threat landscape of industrial information systems
similar to the corporate systems one. Attackers do not ignore their new entry
points, leading to an increasing trend in attacks against ICSs. [51][52].
As a result, is it important to follow recommendations issued by state insti-
tutions and in most cases mandatory to meet the security requirements they
establish. In the US, the NIST and the American National Standards Institute
(ANSI) are the regulatory bodies that are responsible for SCADA systems and
their security [53]. On the other hand, in the EU, cyber security recommenda-
tions and regulations, including those related with Industrial Control Systems,
are issued by the European Union Agency for Network and Information Security
(ENISA) [54].
As a general rule, it is crucial that SCADA systems and any related develop-
ments are designed with security in mind, in order to oer the best protection
against potential attacks. One important aspect of security is the accountabil-
ity of commands. Any organization should be able to determine which user
requested the execution of each action, in order to ensure that wrongful actions
can be prosecuted and to manage incident response procedures.
Moreover, accountability, like any security property, must be as resilient as
possible to system compromise. In other words, the number of nodes whose
compromise would keep the system from providing accountability must be lim-
ited.
Accountability is only valid in environments where authentication can be trusted.
The link between an user and their actions is completely dependant on them
being authenticated. Otherwise, impersonation is possible and records cannot
be trusted. Thus, non-repudiation would not be provided.
As a result, authentication must be considered a hard requirement. Every node,
and particularly those that perform industrial control operations, must be able
to authenticate the source of any command, even when it is not received directly,
but forwarded by a third party. Source authentication in the presence of middle
nodes is called multi-tier authentication, covered in the next section (x3.4).
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3.4 Multi-tier authentication
As stated in x2.1, authentication is the process that ensures that an entity is
who it claims to be. A simple authentication operation involves two parties: an
entity A that sends a message and an entity B that receives it and veries that
entity A is who they claim to be.
However, there are situations where A and B do not communicate directly, but
there is one or several middle nodes (Mi) that forward messages from A to B
and may also need to authenticate the source. In that architecture, the authen-
tication process is dened as multi-tier or multi-hop authentication. Figure 4
compares this operation with its simpler counterpart, single-hop authentication.
Figure 4: Single-hop and multi-hop authentication
The main challenge of multi-hop authentication is the need to provide means
of verication of the source identity of a particular message at several nodes.
The most simpler approach is to authenticate and trust each forwarding node
to identify the initial sender. A source identity eld would be a easy imple-
mentation of this solution. Kerberos also provides this functionality (Kerberos
delegation), by the use of proxiable tickets, that allow a node to impersonate
the original sender.
However, trusting the the forwarding node to verify the identity of the initial
sender makes the system vulnerable to the compromise of any of the middle
nodes. Should an attacker have access to any of them, they would be able to
change commands, impersonating any user. Kerberos delegation, reduces the
surface of the attacked by limiting the possible target users to those whose ticket
in the server has not expired. Nevertheless, the vulnerability is still present.
Moreover, multi-hop authentication solutions based on symmetric cryptography
need the sender to know the destination in order to obtain a key shared with
them, reducing the operational exibility at the middle nodes.
On the other hand, asymmetric cryptography provides a way to authenticate
the sender regardless of the destination. As a result, it is a common solution
for solving the multi-hop authentication problem. As long as a node can link a
public key and an identity, any messages coming from that entity can be veried.
The main challenge with asymmetric-key based authentication is the need for
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associating an identity and a public key. Typically, a Public Key Infrastructure
(PKI) is established to provide this functionality by the use of certicates and
the establishment of a Certication Authority.
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4 Methodology
This Master thesis methodology relies on the design science paradigm. Most
Information Systems research rely either on this paradigm or on behavioural
science [55]. The former focuses on the creation of "innovative artefacts", while
in behavioural science the purpose is to explain or predict human behaviour
[55].
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Consistent with the design science research model previously described, research begins with 
Awareness of a Problem. Design science research is sometimes called “Improvement Research” 
and this designation emphasizes the problem-solving/performance-improving nature of the 
activity. Suggestions for a problem solution are abductively drawn from the existing 
knowledge/theory base for the problem area (Pierce, 1931). These suggestions may, however, be 
inadequate for the problem or suffer from significant knowledge gaps (which make the problem a 
research problem). Using existing knowledge, an attempt is made at creatively solving the 
problem. The solution—a tentative design—is used to implement an artifact in the next phase 
shown as Development in the diagram. Partially or fully successful implementations are then 
evaluated according to a functional specification (sometimes implicit) during the Evaluation stage. 
Development, Evaluation, and further Suggestion are frequently iteratively performed in the course 
of the research effort. The basis of the iteration, the flow from partial completion of the cycle back 
to Awareness of the Problem, is indicated by the Circumscription arrow. Conclusion indicates the 
end of a research cycle or the termination of a specific design science research project.  
Knowledge contribution resulting from new knowledge production is indicated in Figure 4 by the 
arrows labeled: Circumscription and Design Science Knowledge. The Circumscription process is 
especially important to understanding design science research process because it generates 
understanding that could only be gained from the specific act of construction. Circumscription is 
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Figure 5: Design Science Research Cycle [4]
The design science research proc s consists in ve step , shown in Figure 5.
This chapter states how each of those steps is reected in this thesis.
Awarenes f Problem The introduc chapter justies the need for the
research conducted in this thesis, dening the existing problem that we are
addressing. This problem is specically dened for our target environment in
the requirements chapter.
Suggestion The analysis chapter studies several potential solutions to the
research problem and conducts a qualitative comparison of them. The inves-
tigative p ocess st rted from two coarse grained options, namely asymmetric
and symmetric cryptography. Then, they were extended, by dening dierent
alternatives within those two main categories.
Finally, one of the potential designs was selected, after comparing it with the
other options in terms of security level, performance and implementation costs.
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Thus, the result of the analysis chapter is a solution suggestion, whose explana-
tion is extended in the design chapter. Therefore, both chapters represent the
suggestion step in this thesis.
Moreover, even though the theory and the background chapters do not strictly
belong to any of the steps we dened, they are the basis of the analysis chap-
ter. They cover the research done before the analysis and the information they
content is crucial not only for performing the analysis of possible solutions, but
also for potential readers of the thesis to understand that analysis.
Development The implementation chapter can be identied with the devel-
opment step. It details the prototype implementation of the proposed design.
In other words, it describes the construction of the artefact. The purpose of
this step is not to develop an state-of-the-art nal product, but to demonstrate
the validity of the suggestion.
The product of this stage not only includes the related chapter on the thesis,
but also the code written for generating an actual working artefact. Following
the design, a basic implementation was written, that performed the minimal
required operations for considering a valid instance of our design. It consisted in
the conguration of the AD server for storing public keys and on the generation
of two console applications that exchanged messages between them: the signing
and the verifying applications.
However, once that Minimum Viable Product (MVP) was produced and tested,
new features were added progressively to address certain limitations when ap-
plying the design to the target architecture:
 A Graphical User Interface (GUI) was added to the initial console appli-
cation in the signing node.
 The RSA algorithm was included as an option in the verifying node and
as an extra standalone application in the signing node.
 A purge script was created for periodically removing obsolete keys from
the AD.
 Two alternative solutions were proposed for avoiding high delays in the
key exchange process due to the low frequency replication of AD domain
controllers when they are logically placed in dierent sites.
Therefore, our implementation relies on a prototyping approach to construct
the nal artefact. Particularly, our coding process is based on experimental
prototyping [56]: we focus on the technical implementation of our design.
Moreover, our nal artefact must not be considered as ready for deployment,
since, as stated before its main purpose is to demonstrate de validity of the
suggestion. A product ready for production environment falls out of the scope
of this thesis, as it would require to adapt it to dierent ABB proprietary
protocols and to test it in more realistic simulations.
Evaluation Both the performance evaluation and the discussion chapters can
be identied with the evaluation step. The discussion chapter assess to which
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extent requirements are fullled (i.e. how well the problem is solved). This
assessment is based on the performance evaluation for parameters that could be
measured in our mock implementation. It consists in a quantitative study of the
eect of our solution on the target architecture. However, the fullment of other
requirements, such as the required level of security, is intrinsically qualitative
and thus more dicult to assess. The discussion section relies on the theoretical
foundation and on the analysis to decide to which extent our work fulls those
requirements.
Conclusion The conclusion step is covered in this thesis in the chapter with
the same name. It summarizes the process, the results of the thesis and whether
the research questions are answered. Furthermore, it suggests how our research
can be extended, by providing several future work possibilities.
Communication Some authors explicitly consider an additional nal step
that lies in communicating the result to the appropriate audiences [57]. This
whole thesis document and its presentation in KTH represent the communica-
tion step.
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5 Requirements
This chapter establishes the requirements that the solution to be proposed by
this thesis must full. Establishing a set of requirements not only provides
guidance for delivering a design and its implementation, but also helps validating
them.
5.1 Architecture constrains
Studying the target architecture is crucial. Not only for determining the costs
and the impact of implementing the proposed solution, but also for maximizing
compatibility with the existent deployment. Current architecture is shown in
Figure 6. Operators connect to the SCADA servers through an access server,
that acts as a proxy for their commands.
Figure 6: Simplied representation of the current architecture
The connection between the user station application and the access server is
based on Remote Procedure Calls (RPCs)5. On the target architecture, RPC
messages are sent over a Kerberos tunnel, thus condentiality and integrity of
the messages sent to the access server is guaranteed. Moreover, authentication
of the operators is also ensured, since users are required to log in with their
Kerberos credentials to be able to send commands to the access servers.
Once a message arrives to an access server, it is forwarded to the appropriate
SCADA server. As for the previous step, the communication is RPC based
and protected by a Kerberos tunnel. Nevertheless, the access server is authen-
ticated against the SCADA server using a service account. The same one is
used regardless of the operator that made the request. Thus, accountability
cannot be ensured, since the SCADA server does not know which user issued
each command.
The proposed design needs to consider this architecture. Particularly, the access
server needs to be kept in the middle of the connection between the operator
station and the SCADA servers. Its presence provides scalability, by forward-
ing commands from dierent sources using an unique connection to the target
SCADA server.
The solution needs to focus on ensuring accountability at the SCADA servers,
while also providing authorization at the access servers. In other words, access
servers should only forward commands sent by authorised users and SCADA
servers must know who is the issuer of each command.
5RPC: Inter-process communation technology that provides location transparency. Calls
to remote procedures can be done as if they where local.
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Finally, the new design should be as transparent to the user as possible. Par-
ticularly, users should not need to log in or provide their credentials more than
once.
5.2 Security requirements
As previously stated, security in SCADA systems is a priority, and enforced by
several regulations in some countries. Our design should be secure enough to
comply with these requirements.
The main requirement of our design is that accountability is provided at the
SCADA server, while the access server continues to manage the authorization
for issuing commands. The desing should be resilient to the compromise of the
access server. Even if an attacker takes partial or total control of an access
server, they should not be able to send commands to the SCADA server spoof-
ing the identity of an operator. Moreover, providing the access server is not
compromised, it must not forward commands to the SCADA server if they are
not issued by authorized users.
In addition, the current architecture already provides condentiality and in-
tegrity at each step of the communication by using Kerberos tunnels. The
design provided by this thesis must guarantee at least the same level of data
protection as what is currently enforced. Nevertheless, improvements can be
made. For instance, integrity may be ensured end-to-end (from operator sta-
tion to access server).
Furthermore, protection against common attacks against security protocols must
be in place:
 Man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks They consist in relaying the
communication between to parties, acting as a illegitimate proxy. The
total avoidance of this attacks is out of the scope of this thesis, since it
involves network administration policies. However, by encrypting and ver-
ifying the integrity of the communications their eects can be mitigated.
 Replay attacks They are based on sending valid transmissions repeated
or delayed. An attacker could re-send commands issued by an authorized
user or even manipulate the network to produce a delay on valid com-
mands. As a result, commands should have an expiration time, while
leaving a margin for message Round Trip Time (RTT) (currently, mes-
sages expire after 25 seconds). Moreover, commands must be considered
only once. Subsequent repetitions of the same command request should
be ignored and possibly logged.
5.3 Performance requirements
Broadly, there is a trade-o between the level of security that a particular ar-
chitecture oers and the communication latency and CPU usage of the involved
systems. Cryptographic operations have computational costs, especially when
using public-key algorithms. Moreover, they usually imply overheads on the
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message size or count (i.e. messages to a third-party authentication server or
protocol overheads). Compression can help mitigate this overhead, but it also
generates computational costs.
SCADA operations are potentially critical. Thus, the time frame between the
issuing of a command by the operator and its execution by the SCADA server
must be as short as possible. Current ABB deployments manage to keep this
latency under 1 second. The proposed design must not suppose a signicant
increment on the latency of command execution.
Finally, computational resources must also be preserved. If the new architecture
needs to perform more intensive operations, a greater number of CPU cycles
would be used. This need for more CPU cycles could produce increments in
energy costs. It could even lead to current systems not being able to run the
new architecture. Therefore, the proposed solution should keep computational
resource utilization to similar or lower levels than the current ones.
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6 Analysis
Building up in the background and the theoretical foundation, this chapter will
discuss the possible designs that would full the previously established require-
ments. Namely, three possible solutions and several variations are considered:
One is based on Kerberos delegation, while the other two maintain the current
Kerberos architecture, and provide authentication either by using public-key or
symmetric-key cryptography. Digital signatures are considered as a an exam-
ple of public-key authentication and symmetric-key solutions are evaluated by
analysing the particular case of using HMAC with Kerberos session keys.
6.1 Trusting the access server: Kerberos delegation
Kerberos delegation is the most straight-forward approach for fullling the re-
quirements, since the current deployment is already Kerberos-based. Therefore,
this solution would only need to give the adequate permissions to the access
servers so they can authenticate against the SCADA server as if they were the
client.
This alternative would be completely transparent to the user, not even needing
to modify client-side applications. Changes would be needed in the Active Di-
rectory Domain Controller, enabling Kerberos Delegation for the access servers.
Afterwards, access servers would need to be set up so they use the client cre-
dentials for authenticating against the SCADA servers. Finally, accountability
of user commands should be enabled at the SCADA servers, ensuring that each
command and its issuer is recorded, and non-repudiation provided.
Performance The main advantage of Kerberos delegation for the target ar-
chitecture is its low latency and CPU usage impact that it would have. At the
client side there is no impact, since no modications are needed in that tier.
Moreover, SCADA servers already record the issued commands. Thus, the
only overhead at this tier consists in reading the user name during the client
authentication process. This operation is computationally simple and should
not signicantly aect latency or CPU usage.
In addition, at the access servers, the dierence from the current design is that
instead of using a service account ticket for authenticating against the SCADA
server, a client to server ticket would be in place, requested using the received
proxiable ticket. It is likely that more requests to the Authentication Server
(AS) are needed, since one ticket would be requested per user, but those tickets
will be cached by the access server and valid until expired. Therefore, only
commands from new users or those sent just after the client ticket has expired
are likely to have a higher latency.
In any case, symmetric key operations are not very computational expensive
and the ASs are typically installed on the same network as the servers. Thus,
neither latency nor CPU usage would be substantially aected at the access
servers.
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Security The main limitation of this design is the level of trust that it gives
to the access servers. Their power impersonating the users should be contained,
by limiting their delegation capabilities only to the services provided by the
SCADA services.
Nevertheless, even if limitations are imposed, access servers would be still be
very powerful. They would be able to send commands using the credentials of
any user that has recently logged in to the server. Thus, if the access server is
compromised, the trust on the accountability at the SCADA servers is broken,
and non-repudiation not provided.
Conclusion In summary, Kerberos delegation would be easy to implement
over the current architecture and would not signicantly increment latency or
CPU usage. However, it relies too much on the access servers. The compromise
of an access server would lead to a lost of trust on the authentication at the
SCADA servers, since the server can send commands impersonating any recently
connected user. Consequently, it would not be possible to properly authenticate
commands and non-repudiation would not be provided.
6.2 Symmetric-key cryptography: HMAC over the cur-
rent Kerberos architecture
Currently, users authenticate against the access servers using their user ac-
counts. When the access server forwards messages to a SCADA server, it is au-
thenticated using the server service account. Since Kerberos relies on symmetric-
key cryptography, solutions that are also based on this type of cryptography
are potentially simpler to implement, since key management can be done by
Kerberos. There are several methods of providing integrity and source authen-
tication relying on symmetric-key, being keyed-Hash Message Authentication
Code (HMAC) one of the most common.
In this set up, the client would need to request two client-to-server tickets and
corresponding session keys. One would be meant for authenticating against
the access server, by presenting it during Kerberos protocol authentication.
The other ticket, designed for authentication of the client against the SCADA
server, would be sent as part of the message. Particularly, the message would
include the command, the mentioned ticket, a timestamp value and a nonce
value. Together with the session key associated with the ticket, it would be the
input for generating the HMAC, which would be appended to the message when
sending it. Figure 7 shows the message construction process.
At the access server, there is no signicant dierence from the original behaviour.
It would read the command from the message if needed, while the rest of the
content would be ignored, since authentication of the client is provided by the
Kerberos protocol. When forwarding the message to the SCADA server, an
immutable part should be kept as received from the operator, including all
parameters and the HMAC.
Finally, the SCADA server would receive the message with the appended HMAC.
The access server is authenticated via the Kerberos protocol. For authenticating
the operator, the SCADA server would need to extract the session key from the
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Figure 7: Message with HMAC sent to the access server
ticket on the message, that also includes the operator's identity information.
Using that session key and the message, an HMAC can be generated from the
immutable part of the message and compared to the appended one. If there is
a match, the operator is authenticated and the command can be executed and
recorded for accountability.
Performance The process performed at the operator's station implies re-
questing an extra ticket if there is no valid cached ticket available for authen-
ticating the operator against the SCADA server. Therefore, latency would be
aected when issuing commands for the rst time or after ticket expiration.
Moreover, HMAC generation computational cost depends on the hashing algo-
rithm underneath. Even when using secure algorithms, such as SHA-256, CPU
utilization is low [58], particularly for inputs as short as the ones expected for
this architecture (text based commands). Thus, the main overhead at the client
would be the ticket request operation, which would not be needed for every
command.
In addition, there is no performance or latency overhead at the access server,
whose functioning is the same as before.
Furthermore, the overhead at the SCADA server is low. It needs to decrypt the
ticket, using its key with the KDC. Since it is a symmetric key operation, it
is not computationally complex. Moreover, the HMAC has to be generated for
comparing it to the one appended to the message. As stated before, generating
a hash does not produce an important computational overhead.
Security When using Kerberos, the trust lies in the KDC. Similarly, since
this solution relies on Kerberos for key management, the KDC is also the source
of trust. It generates the session key to be used in the communication by any
two parties. Thus, if the KDC is compromised, session keys would be exposed,
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and users would be potentially impersonated.
However, in comparison with Kerberos delegation, the HMAC solution oers
better authentication and integrity protection, meeting those requirements even
if an access server is compromised. By maintaining the current architecture,
condentiality, integrity and node authentication in node-to-node connections
(e.g. operator to access server or access server to SCADA server) are provided.
On top of that, HMAC oers end-to-end integrity and source authentication,
by guaranteeing that the issuer of any message is in possession of the session
key used for generating the HMAC. That session key should only be known by
the KDC, the sender and the receiver. Therefore, as long as the receiver trusts
the KDC, the message HMAC is enough proof that the message was originated
by the user with whom it shares the session key and who is identied by the
information contained in client-to-server ticket.
Conclusion This solution does not incur in great installation or management
costs, since the current architecture is kept. Moreover, the solution highly relies
on the already available Kerberos infrastructure, only requiring small modica-
tions at the SCADA server and in operator applications to implement HMAC,
and on the access servers to keep an immutable HMAC'ed part when forwarding
messages. In addition, CPU usage increment is low, since hash operations are
computationally ecient. Latency would only be aected in some commands,
due to ticket requests.
Nevertheless, the HMAC solution has an important drawback. Since messages
are signed using a session key tailored to a particular service, the user would
need to know beforehand which service account is running in the destination
server. Thus, there is no exibility in the access server for forwarding commands,
reducing its utility.
6.2.1 Unknown server HMAC-based authentication end-to-end
The lack of exibility of the HMAC-based solution could be addressed by imple-
menting a method for requesting client authentication as a response, similar to
HTTP 401 messages. If an end server receives a message from an access server,
that does not include an HMAC or whose HMAC was not generated with a
session key established by the KDC for that server and client, it answers back
with an "authentication error" message, stating its identity.
When the client receives that response, forwarded by the access server, it would
request a ticket for the server, according to the identity information in the
response. Then it would send the command again, but this time with the
HMAC generated with the session key for client and end-server.
This extension for HMAC based authentication, xes the exibility problem of
this solution. Moreover, it is still stateless, not needing any extra infrastructure,
like public-key solutions commonly do. However, should there be authentication
errors at the SCADA server, latency would be signicantly incremented. The
message would need to be sent twice (even more if there is more than one middle
server) and extra ticket request(s) would be required. As a result, latency would
31
be at least twice as usually, reaching unacceptable levels.
6.2.2 Unknown server HMAC-based authentication with access server
implication
The previous solution main drawback is its latency. However, if the access
server takes part in the HMAC-based authentication process latency can be
reduced. The sender could include who the HMAC is destined to (if any) in the
message. Thus, the access server would be able send and authentication error if
the HMAC for the nal destination is missing, avoiding forwarding the message
to the nal server if it cannot be authenticated at that node.
Nevertheless, the access servers would need to check a new eld on the mes-
sages and they must be able to send "authentication error" messages, leading
to more signicant implementation eort at the access servers. Moreover, mes-
sages would still need to be sent twice. Even if the rst message is not forwarded
to the nal destination, latency is signicantly incremented when compared to
the current architecture.
6.2.3 HMAC-based authentication for a pool of servers
When using HMAC there is a trade-o between exibility and latency. If the
HMAC is generated for a particular server, only that server can rely on it for
authenticating the sender of the message.
On the other hand, if HMACs are generated on demand, latency is increased,
as messages would need to be sent twice. The rst communication is needed
for the access server to decide which server is the nal destination and reply
back to the issuer with an authentication error message. The second delivery is
actual message sending, with the HMAC for the destination server attached.
A middle-ground solution is also possible. It would be based on a pool of possible
nal destination servers. A list of them would be available at the access servers,
so users can update it periodically. In order to send a message they add the
HMAC for every server on the list. Therefore, any of the destination servers
would be able to corroborate the sender's identity, by verifying the HMAC
generated with the key shared between that server and the sender.
When sending a message, a user would need to request a ticket for each possible
nal destination server, and append an HMAC for each of them. Thus, this
solution is only suitable if the pool of servers has a small size. With a high
count of possible nal servers, the number of ticket requests would notably aect
latency and message size would be signicantly increased, due to the number of
appended HMACs.
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6.3 Public-key cryptography: Digital signatures over the
current Kerberos architecture
6.3.1 Public Key Infrastructure for credential management
As stated in x2.5.1, digital signatures are a common technology for user authen-
tication. They use public-key cryptography for securely validating identities.
In order to manage user credentials, it is common to establish a Public Key
Infrastructure (PKI). Particularly, a Certication Authority (CA) would be set
up and certicates for every user and server issued. Moreover, revocation ca-
pabilities should be included for maintaining security after credential theft or
loss.
This solution would rely on sending the commands together with a digital sig-
nature of a part that remains unchanged end-to-end. Messages, and thus the
signature input, must include a nonce value, to avoid them being reissued by an
unauthorized party, and a time stamp, so delayed messages are not considered.
The digital signature would be generated using the operator's private key. Thus,
any receiver can verify the identity of the operator, provided they trust the CA
that issued the operator's certicate.
Using digital signatures passes some responsibilities to the user, since they need
to generate their key pairs, get their credentials (digital certicate) veried
by the CA and follow best practices for protecting them. Security could be
improved by using cryptographic cards, designed to store PKI certicates. They
would reduce the risk of compromise, as they have better protection mechanisms
than software-based PKI credentials storage, but they also imply higher costs
and a greater burden to users, who would be provided with an extra physical
device.
Furthermore, client-side applications would also need modications to be com-
patible with this design. Particularly they would need to have access to the
client's certicate and use it to sign every issued command.
Nevertheless, access servers would not need any modication, since they can
keep using Kerberos for authenticating the client and the SCADA servers. They
just need to preserve the immutable part of the message and its signature present
on the received commands when forwarding them.
In addition, SCADA servers would need to verify command signature before
executing and recording them. For that purpose, they must have the certicate
of the trusted CA that signed client certicates. When issuing the commands,
the time stamp and the nonce must be checked against the database and the
system clock, to avoid replay or delay attacks. It would also discard legitimate
commands delayed for technical reasons, avoiding unexpected consequences in
the system. After commands are executed, in order to provide non-repudiation
and to be able to verify subsequent ones, they should be recorded into the
database, together with the user name of the operator, the time stamp and the
nonce.
Moreover, although it is not a requirement, authentication of SCADA server
responses can be also implemented, by signing the reponses in the SCADA
server, using a certicate issued to it. The client application would then verify
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those responses by validating their signature.
Performance This design would have greater eects in CPU usage than Ker-
beros based solutions. As stated in x2.3, public-key operations computational
cost is high, in comparison with symmetric key operations. Thus, CPU usage
would be aected, both at the client node, that needs to sign the commands be-
fore sending them, and at the SCADA server that needs to validate the signature
before executing each received command.
Furthermore, the degree to which latency would be aected by cryptographic
operations would depend on the computational power of the SCADA server and
the operator station. However, in contrast with Kerberos delegation, tickets
would not be used for authentication of the client at the SCADA server. Thus
the latency increment related with those ticket requests would be removed.
As a result, the latency increment produced by cryptographic operations can
be compensated by the reduction in ticket-related communications, as long as
signing nodes have enough computational power.
Moreover, certicate revocation, when done using CRLs, would only aect la-
tency and CPU usage when the list is being updated. What is more, certicate
generation operations have a high computational cost, and thus CPU usage,
particularly when using RSA. However, certicates are commonly valid for long
periods of time (e.g. months or years), making this CPU usage peak rare and,
consequently, not very signicant.
In addition, certicate revocation would also aect the CA, that needs to keep
track of revoked certicates, and any node that performs signature verication.
Nodes would need to periodically download CRLs or to perform requests using
the OCSP protocol for each verication operation. For this architecture, the
former is a better option, since it is unlikely that it would aect the latency of
the verication operations as it can be done regularly (e.g. daily), when system
load is expected to be low.
Security Public-key cryptography, and consequently digital signatures, oer
a very high level of security, by uniquely identifying a user. In contrast with
symmetric-key based solutions, including HMAC or Kerberos, digital signatures
can be used regardless of the receiver of the signed payload. In other words, a
signed message can be veried by any receiver, providing they trust the CA the
issued the certicate of the signing party. Moreover, the receiver does not need
to know the private key. Thus, signing a message proves that its issuer is in
possession of the private key associated to the signature, but does not require
the receiver to know it.
In addition, public-key cryptography increases the security of the credentials
sent over the network. In contrast with symmetric-key solutions, neither the
private keys nor their hashes are sent over the network, reducing the success
potential of brute-force attacks. They would only be possible against public
keys, designed to withstand them. Moreover, if cryptographic cards were used,
private keys would never be exposed, as long as the card is in possession of the
legitimate owner and its security is not broken (i.e. card vulnerabilities).
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However, if PKI is used for credential management, public-key cryptography
security lies on the CA. The same way as with the KDC when relying on
symmetric-key cryptography, if the CA is compromised, the whole system is
exposed too, since the intruder would be able to generate certicates for any
user and therefore generate valid signed commands. As a result, using digital
signatures creates a new weak point to be targeted by malicious parties: the
CA. It is an advantage for security, since it distributes security among dier-
ent nodes and technologies (defence in depth), but it also increases the security
team eort, by creating a new critical asset to protect.
Conclusion This solution provides a higher level of security than symmetric-
key based ones, since, by using digital signatures, it unequivocally identies
the issuer of a command, even considering access servers to be compromised.
Moreover, users can send signed commands without knowing which particular
server is the receiver.
However, it has a high overhead in terms of installation and maintenance. It
requires a PKI, and thus a server acting as a CA. Certicates would need to be
issued periodically and after revocation, aecting the CA server itself and the
clients that need to update them on their devices.
6.3.2 Active Directory for credential management
Due to the cost and eort of deploying a PKI, a solution that relies on digital
signatures, while not needing extra infrastructure, has been studied. Should
a PKI not be in place, an alternative method for the servers to corroborate
user identities must be implemented. Particularly, users' public keys must be
available to the server that is verifying their signatures.
Moreover, the target architecture uses Microsoft's Active Directory (AD) for
managing user credentials. Therefore, for the purpose of reducing deployment
eort and cost, this design relies on this service for storing users' public keys.
Thus, users would not need to have their certicates signed by a CA, as no
certicates would be required. On the contrary, they would only need their
public key to be stored in the AD, associated with their user name.
Since it is also based in digital signatures, the overall functioning of this solution
is similar to the PKI-based architecture. The user needs to append a signature
to the messages it sends, so the receiving node can verify the identity of the
sender, even it is not send directly (i.e. sent through the access server).
However, this functioning alone would not be enough for providing authentica-
tion end to end, since the absence of a PKI would make verifying the identity
of the command issuer impossible. Thus, as stated previously, clients need to
generate their key pairs and send them to the AD server. This server should
support messages from authenticated users that want to add or update their
public keys on the directory.
Asymmetric key pairs do not need to be generated for each message. Key gen-
eration is commonly done performed periodically (e.g. yearly) and the same
private key used for signing several commands. Nevertheless, keys can be gen-
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erated for each session, in a similar way to Kerberos tickets. While it would
increment latency at the time when operators log in, it provides several advan-
tages. Particularly, it would reduce key management eort, increase security on
shared workstations and facilitate the use of several workstations by the same
operator.
Moreover, in order to reduce the latency of message signature verication, re-
ceiving servers can cache users' public keys. Thus, public keys are only requested
when the sender's key is unknown, and store locally on the server. Unlike when
using PKI, since keys are generated for each session, there is no need for key
revocation procedures, as keys would be dynamic and expire after short periods
of time, like Kerberos tickets do.
In addition, for each message, the receiving end must be able to access the AD
to consult the public key of the alleged sender and corroborate their identity,
by verifying the message's signature. Since the AD server provides provides key
management to the whole infrastructure, public keys stored there are available
for every domain host, as long as the appropriate permissions are set.
Performance The computational eciency of digital signatures is similar,
regardless of the credential management technique. Signing and verifying of
signatures and key generation would use the same amount of computational
power when using AD than when using a PKI, depending on the length of the
keys.
However, unlike with the PKI-based solution, there is no need for having a CA,
eliminating the potential impact of running that service. Credential manage-
ment is part of the AD server, that stores the public keys of the users and pro-
vides access to them. Since AD is already present in the architecture, providing
access to users' credentials would not have signicant performance impact.
Nevertheless, depending on how often users log in, latency could be aected by
this solution. In general, when operators log in, keys should be generated and
the public one pushed to the AD. Key generation is computationally intensive,
particularly when using RSA. Moreover, receiving servers can use cached keys
for short periods of time and update them after expiration or when a message
is signed with a dierent key (potential workstation switch).
Moreover, if several AD servers exist, inconsistencies would be shortly present
after public keys are pushed. Therefore, operators would not be able to use the
system immediately after log in. Instead, they would need to wait until their
public keys are propagated across the AD servers, so they are available to the
receiving end.
Security As discussed before, digital signatures provide a great level of secu-
rity, by ensuring unequivocal authentication, relying on asymmetric key cryp-
tography. They identify the sender regardless of the receiver. Thus, unlike with
symmetric-key based solutions, the destination identity can be unknown when
sending the message. Moreover, the receiver cannot impersonate the sender,
since the private key used for signing is only known by the sender.
In comparison with PKI-based digital signatures, this solution removes the need
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of establishing a PKI, while providing a similar level of security. The main
dierence is that instead of having the CA as a source of trust, the AD server
is the node that provides that service.
Therefore, the AD server is a SPOF6, since it manages user credentials both for
the Kerberos protocol and for the digital signatures. As a result, management
is less complex, but failure or compromise of that server would have a great
impact on the whole architecture. Redundancy and protection measures should
be applied, but fall out of the scope of this thesis.
Conclusion As stated previously, digital signatures provide a high level of
security, since they unequivocally prove that the owner of a key-pair is the
sender of a message. However, using asymmetric cryptography usually implies
the deployment of a PKI, incurring in extra management and implementation
costs.
This solution is based on using Active Directory for storing users' public keys,
instead of relying on certicates signed by a CA. Thus, the need for extra in-
frastructure is eliminated, while a equivalent level of security provided. Latency
can be increased when operators log in, especially in environments with several
AD servers, but it is not expected to aect the functioning of the architecture
once public keys are distributed across all AD servers.
6.4 Discussion
In order to decide which method is the most secure and which one is recom-
mended for implementation at ABB, several aspects must be compared. Namely,
performance, security and implementation and management eort. This section
will compare the possible solutions according to those parameters. Table 5 sum-
marizes the results of that comparison from a technological perspective. For a
deployment and implementation summary, refer to Table 6.
Latency In order to decide the performance impact of each solution, their
latency and CPU usage eect must be evaluated. In terms of latency, every
solution would generate increments in the time between command issue by the
user and its execution at the SCADA server. This could be motivated by ad-
ditional Kerberos ticket requests or due to cryptographic operations, such as
HMAC generation or digital signing.
Some solutions need to send periodical messages. Digital signatures need up-
dated public keys, which, when using PKI, is achieved with periodical syn-
chronization. Similarly, when using the HMAC solution that targets a pool of
servers, the server list nets to be up to date. This can be achieved using period-
ical synchronization or, for very static environments, by manual conguration
in operator stations.
In any case, these messages do not need to be sent very frequently, since public
keys are designed for long term usage and pools of servers are expected to be
highly static. Therefore, even if they can aect latency of messages sent at the
6SPOF: Single Point Of Failure
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same time, there are simple network operations that do not need a high amount
of resources. Moreover, this synchronization operations should be performed
in server o-peak times, to have potentially more available resources and avoid
unwanted eects on critical operations.
Furthermore, Kerberos delegation eect on latency is minimal. When requesting
a ticket for communicating with the SCADA server, the SCADA server does
not use a service account. Instead, it asks for a ticket using the proxiable
ticket received from the client. Since tickets are dierent for each client, even
if they are cached, more tickets requests are to be made (one for each client).
However, only with a high number of dierent operators sending commands this
modication would aect latency. Even if that is the case, the impact would
not be high, since ticket requests are simple operations and they are not needed
for each message, only after ticket expiration.
Moreover, digital signatures use the current underlying architecture (service
account authentication server-to-server). Nevertheless, when using AD for cre-
dential management, public keys must be checked after expiration, which can
aect the latency of some messages. The main latency impact of this solution
occurs at the time when the user logs in. The eect is not expected to be sig-
nicant, since a lookup on the AD is a simple operation. However, operators'
public keys need to be stored and, if many AD servers are in place, propagated
so it can be available to the receiving end. This propagation operation could
take several minutes, creating a delay at logging in time.
What is more, HMAC solutions need to request a ticket that contains the shared
key between them if the server. When using HMAC for a pool of servers the
amount of requests depends on the number of servers in the pool. Therefore, the
higher the count of servers was, the greater impact in latency the HMAC would
have. If tickets are cached, they do not need to be requested until expiration.
However, the number of servers would aect the amount of needed HMAC
calculations and the length of the message, having a latency impact even when
no ticket requests are performed.
Furthermore, HMAC solutions that do not know the target beforehand have a
signicant latency impact. If end servers are the nodes that request the messages
to have HMAC, latency is at least doubled, as messages must be send twice to
the end server. On the other hand, if the HMAC is requested by the access
server, depending on which node the message needs to be sent to, the latency
impact is not as high, but still very signicant. Messages are only forwarded
once to the end-server but need to be sent twice to the access server.
Finally, both HMAC and digital signature operations can have an impact on
latency. However, messages are not expected to be very long. Even with pay-
loads of tens of MB, modest processors can perform digital signature and HMAC
operations in short periods of time (in the order of milliseconds) [7].
CPU usage CPU usage impact would not be high in symmetric-key based
solutions. This type of cryptography is not computationally intensive. More-
over, supporting operations for symmetric-key solutions, such as extra network
requests (Kerberos tickets) or HMAC generation, are not CPU intensive either.
On the other hand, digital signatures are based on public-key cryptography. As
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Table 5: Comparison of the impact of the proposed solutions from a technolog-
ical perspective. Each value is not absolute, but given in relation to the rest of
the solutions
Solution
Latency CPU
usage
Security
improvement
Periodical
messagesMessage Log in
Kerberos delegation Minimal No Low Low No
HMAC: One server Low No Low Medium No
HMAC: Pool of servers Medium No Medium Medium Yes
HMAC: Requested by access server Medium No Low Medium No
HMAC: Requested by end server High No Low Medium No
Digital signatures: PKI Low No Medium High Yes
Digital signatures: AD Low Yes Medium High No
a result, digital signing operations would generate a greater increment in CPU
usage, due to the computational cost of public-key cryptographic operations.
The importance of the CPU usage increment is subject to the computational
resources available at the server and at the operator's workstation. Benchmarks
show that although public key operations are more resource intensive than their
symmetric counterparts, they do not signicantly aect CPU usage.
According to ENCRYPT II benchmarks, modern processors need less cycles for
signing messages. But even if we consider a modest machine from 2010, with one
1700 MHz processor, results are acceptable. When using RSA 2048, signature
verication of 59 bytes needed 86000 cycles, which is approximately a 5% CPU
usage in 1 millisecond. RSA signing is more resource intensive than verication
( 100 times higher cycle count) [7]. However, this operation is done at the
operator's station, where CPU usage level is not so critical.
If digital signatures rely on Active Directory for credential management, key
generation is performed more frequently than with PKI. Particularly, it is done
each time an operator logs in. If using RSA, the number of cycles needed
can reach signicant values, with a high variance. ECDSA would solve that
limitation, since it provides lower key generation times with consistent results
across executions.
Security Every considered option provides operator authentication at the
SCADA server. Thus non-repudiation requirement would be fullled regard-
less of the solution. However, the level of security provided by each solution is
not the same.
Only Kerberos delegation authentication at the SCADA server is dependant
on the access server, meaning that a compromised access server would break
authentication at the SCADA server and, consequently, non-repudiation. The
rest of the alternatives, provide authentication and accountability at the SCADA
server, even after access exposure.
Moreover, digital signatures are more trustworthy than every other solution.
Since they are based on public-key cryptography, only those who are in posses-
sion of the private key can sign messages. Thus, even if the SCADA server itself
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Table 6: Comparison of proposed solutions depending from a deployment cost
perspective. Each value is not absolute, but given in relation to the rest of the
solutions
Solution
Extra
infrastructure
Management
eort
Implementation
eort
Kerberos delegation No Low Low
HMAC: One server No Low Medium
HMAC: Pool of servers No Medium High
HMAC: Requested by access server No Low High
HMAC: Requested by end server No Low High
Digital signatures: PKI Yes High High
Digital signatures: AD No Low Medium
is compromised, signed messages still provide non-repudiation. On the other
hand, trust in symmetric-key solutions, is build upon shared-keys. Thus non-
repudiation is provided as long as the recipient (the SCADA server) is trusted.
Furthermore, any of the solutions are vulnerable to the compromise of the cre-
dentials management severs. Symmetric-key based solutions rely on the Ker-
beros protocol for credential management, and are consequently vulnerable to
KDC compromise. Similarly, public-key solutions whose credential management
relies on AD would also be aected by the compromise of the KDC, which in
Microsoft environments is typically hosted on the AD server. Finally, if digital
signatures build over a PKI, trust would be broken should an attacker get access
to the CA.
Implementation and management The implementation and management
eort of each solution must also be considered for deciding which option is more
suitable. Kerberos delegation would be the most simple solution to implement,
since it would only imply giving the appropriate permissions to the access server
and setting accountability at the SCADA server, based on Kerberos authenti-
cation.
The rest of the solutions have more complex implementations. In general, all of
them need an immutable part of the message to be kept end-to-end, so the source
can be authenticated based on the HMAC or digital signature of that string.
In addition, there is a need to modify client and SCADA server applications to
support HMAC or digital signatures, and the SCADA server must be able to
read user identities from messages and verify them to provide accountability.
Moreover, while the previously mentioned implementation changes would be
enough for one-server HMAC, the rest of the HMAC-based alternatives need
even more modications.
For instance, when using a pool of servers as target, there is a need for the
operator to identify the HMAC for each server, in order to avoid unnecessary
HMAC verication operations. Furthermore, with requested-HMAC alterna-
tives, an implementation of authentication error messages needs to be consider,
rendering these alternatives more complex.
40
Conversely, digital signature implementation is dierent depending on the cre-
dential management technique. If Active Directory is used, changes would be
needed on the AD server to implement the public key eld and on the commu-
nication end-points (operator and end-server) in order to store, look up and use
the public keys.
Finally, when digital signatures rely on a PKI, implementation costs and re-
quired eort are increased. They are the only alternative that requires extra
infrastructure, a PKI. Particularly, they need a CA that generates user and
server credentials and whose certicate allows for verifying user identities. The
CA itself would need a server to be deployed at, and would create management
challenges. Specically, it would be an additional critical asset to protect and
would need access to operators' and servers' identities. Furthermore, certicate
management must also be considered, since it would imply users and adminis-
trators, who would need to act after certicate expiration or theft.
6.5 Conclusion
In terms of security, digital signatures are the best option. With proper man-
agement, they provide unequivocal authentication, and better non-repudiation
than symmetric-key based solutions. Moreover they meet latency requirements
and their CPU usage impact should not be signicant in modern processors.
Nevertheless, the target architecture does not have a PKI infrastructure in place,
needed for digital signature management and certicate provisioning. ABB
considers that the cost and eort needed for implementing and mataining a
PKI infrastructure is not acceptable, making digital-signature based solution
impractical if based on PKI credential management.
However, the need of PKI can be avoided by the use of Active Directory for
credential management. It provides a security level similar to PKI-based digital
signatures, while not having extra infrastructure needs. Its main limitation
is the latency when the operator logs in. This latency impact is particularly
signicant when several AD servers are in place, due to the synchronization
delay.
On the other hand, symmetric-key based solutions, are not perfect, since keys
are shared between at least two parties. However, authentication can still be
provided, understanding authentication as the possibility of the receiver to iden-
tify the issuer of a command. Nevertheless, since symmetric keys are shared,
the sender must known the identity of the receiver, to authenticate before them.
For situations where the nal destination of a message is known, HMAC can be
used to prove the ownership of a key (e.g. Kerberos session key). However, since
that is not always the case, there is a need for the HMAC architecture to be more
exible, by letting receivers request authenticated (with an HMAC) versions of
the messages they receive. Nevertheless, this solution is not suitable for our
target architecture, since there would be a signicant increment in latency, not
acceptable for the current requirements.
However, HMAC solutions could be considered as an extra security layer for
situations where authentication is critical (i.e. commands with safety implica-
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tions) or when the nal destination is always known, but, as previously stated,
they are not ideal for our target architecture.
Conversely, Kerberos delegation does not increment costs or management eorts
and it does not aect latency. Moreover, it is very exible, since the sender does
not need to know the identity of the recipient and authentication is not message
(end-to-end) but node-to-node based. The access servers are the nodes that
decide where a message should be forwarded and authenticates the user against
the destination or the next access server by impersonating them.
With Kerberos delegation, the trust lies on the access server(s), which can
impersonate any recently connected users. As a result, authentication is only
valid providing that access servers are not compromised. Therefore, even being
the best solution in terms of exibility and implementation eort, Kerberos
delegation does not signicant improve accountability, in comparison with the
current architecture, where the user name is provided by the access server as
part of the message.
In summary, digital signatures are the best solution in terms of provided secu-
rity level, since they provide unequivocal authentication of the message source.
However, PKI-based solutions would mean a high implementation and manage-
ment cost.
Therefore, we consider digital signatures with Active Directory for credential
management to be the most appropriate solution to our target architecture. Its
main drawback is the latency when the operator logs in. If there is only one AD
server it is not expected to be signicant. However, when several AD servers
are in place, synchronization would be needed, increasing the time window for
the user's public key(s) to available to the receiving servers.
Nevertheless, as previously stated, digital signatures provide the greatest level
of security and, if credential management is AD-based, they do not involve high
implementation or maintenance costs, and they do not signicant aect latency
or CPU usage per message. We consider that these benets motivate selecting
this solution, even when the synchronization delay is considered.
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7 Design
The solution selected based on the analysis (x6) relies on digital signatures
for providing source authentication and employs the existing Active Directory
server infrastructure for storing operators' public keys. This chapter will provide
a detailed description of this solution.
The resulting architecture can be divided in two parts: in-band message signing
and verication and out-of-band credential management. The former relies on
digital signatures to provide integrity and source authentication, based on public
keys. The latter allows operators to store their public keys, linked to their
identities in the AD. Thus, it supports the authentication of operators by the
receiving severs, based on the digital signature of their messages.
As with the current architecture, when an operator logs in to a workstation they
are authenticated by the AD server using Kerberos. Once they are authenti-
cated, operator applications generate a key pair and store their public key on an
specic eld in the AD server, whose writing permissions are limited to the own-
ing user of the eld. Thus, a public key in that eld proves the authentication
of the owner of the key by the AD server.
When a user sends a command to the access server, they sign an immutable
part of the message with their private key, generated when logging in. When
the destination receives the command request, forwarded by one or several access
servers, they can authenticate the immutable part of the message by verifying
its digital signature.
However, in order to associate a user with their signature, the server needs its
public keys, available a the AD server. With those keys, the server can verify
the digital signature of the operator. If the result is successful, the command
can be executed and a log with the time, the command content and the identity
of the user kept, providing accountability.
7.1 Message authentication and integrity
The in-band process of message signing and verication provides integrity and
source authentication. When an operator sends a command, the message is
signed using the operator's private key. The command request is then forwarded
by one or several access servers.
In the current architecture, middle nodes do not necessarily preserve the message
issued by the operator, but they typically generate new messages to satisfy
user requests. However, in order to make authentication at the receiving end
possible, the signed part of the message and its signature must be kept end-
to-end. Otherwise, the receiving server would not be able to verify the digital
signature issued by the operator.
Therefore, changes would be needed on the dierent server applications that
perform changes on the commands messages. However, these applications dier
depending on the particular command that is issued. Thus, although some of
them may be tested during the implementation, the focus is put in the signature
and verication process. Studying the upgrade of all of them falls out of the
scope of this thesis.
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Broadly, the upgrade process of middle applications would consist in having
them include the signed part of the message and its signature in a eld kept
after subsequent modications performed by middle nodes. According to ABB,
this operation is possible in their current deployments.
Finally, when a SCADA server (or any other end server) receives a command
request, it needs to read the signed part and verify that the signature was issued
by the operator that allegedly requested the command. Should that be the case,
the command would be executed and the identity of the user, together with the
signed part of the command request, stored for accountability.
7.1.1 Signing
When a user issues a command request, they include a signed part that links the
action they are requesting with their identity. That association is established
by the use of a digital signature. As stated in x2.5.1, a digital signature proves
that the issuer of a message is in possession of the private key linked to a
particular public key. Thus, the presence of an electronic signature, provides
source authentication for any receiving end that trusts the public key of the
issuer.
The main challenge of applying digital signatures is deciding which is the pay-
load to be signed. As previously stated, in the current architecture, messages
are not necessarily preserved unchanged across the dierent nodes they traverse.
On the contrary, access servers provide exibility and scalability by interpreting
commands and issuing new messages in order to execute de actions requested
by the operators.
However, digital signatures are generated from a particular payload, which is
the one that the issuer signs. Thus, if the payload is not preserved unchanged
end-to-end, the verication of the signature would not be possible.
As a result, when operators issue a command, they need to append a signed
text string that describes the command they are requesting. That data must
be appended unchanged to any messages derived from that one, so when the
end-servers receive the associated request(s) they can identify the original issuer
and provide non-repudiation.
What is more, the alleged identity of the user and the public key used for
signing must be also part of the message received by any end-server, so servers
can obtain the public key associated with that identity that was used for signing
and perform signature verication.
Moreover, the signed part of the message must not only include the description
of the requested command, but additional metadata. Particularly, a time stamp
and a nonce value must be present.
A time stamp allows any verifying node to discard delayed commands, that
could lead to unexpected consequences. Whether they are caused by malicious
agents (delay attacks) or by network errors, delayed commands may lead to
unexpected results, especially in real-time environments as the ones SCADA
servers commonly manage. Using a time stamp, receiving nodes can ignore
commands issued after a threshold time.
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In addition, a randomly created nonce (only-once) value provides receiving ends
with a method for discarding repeated commands. Just as delayed messages,
they can be caused by malicious parties (replay attack) or by the network.
They may not be as hazardous as delayed commands but can also aect the
functioning of the system and may be used for launching Denegation of Service
(DoS) attacks.
7.1.2 Verication
The verication process is performed upon reception of a message by SCADA
servers (or any other destination nodes). It provides source authentication and
integrity protection of the signed part of the message.
When a message is received, the alleged user identity is obtained from the
message and the public keys associated with that identity read from the system
cache or from the credential management server. In any case, when using a
public key for verication its creation and expiration date must be checked
against the current time, to ensure the validity of the key.
If any of the cached public keys for the alleged sender matches the one on the
message and it is within its validity period, that public key is selected. Should
none of the cached keys matched the received one, the list of keys is updated
from the AD.
Moreover, once the key contained in the message is conrmed to be associated
with the alleged sender and within its validity period, it is used as the input for
the signature verication process, together with the message and its signature.
If the verication process is not completed successfully with the updated list,
or no key in the list matches the one in the message, that request can be logged
and the security team alerted of a potential impersonation attempt.
On the contrary, if the digital signature matches the appropriate public key, the
process continues. The time stamp is read and compared to the current time,
in order to discard delayed messages. They may be logged but they cannot be
considered as a an indicator of probable compromise, since they are more likely
to be caused by network limitations.
Moreover, the command log must be queried for any messages that share time
stamp and nonce with the received command request, in order to avoid executing
repeated commands. As with delayed messages, they can be logged, but should
not be consider as an indicator of likely compromise.
Once the previously mentioned steps are completed, the requested command
can be executed and logged. Apart from a description of the actions performed
by the SCADA server to full the operator request and any extra information
needed by the system administrators, the log entry must include the data in-
cluded in the signed message: the time stamp, the nonce, and the description
of the operator request.
On the one hand, the time stamp and the nonce are needed during the verica-
tion process for discarding repeated and delayed commands. Thus, the impact
of network errors is mitigated and replay and delay attacks avoided.
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On the other hand, the unchanged description of the command request, as issued
by the operator, is needed for providing non-repudiation. Since authorization
is managed by the access servers, if one of them is compromised the requests
sent to the nal servers may dier from the operator intention when initially
issuing the command. However, even if the SCADA server runs that wrongfully
modied command, the accountability logs would still store the original request
issued by the operator, maintaining the non-repudiation property in the system.
7.2 Credential management
The previous section (x7.1) denes the process of in place for signing messages
and verifying that signature. A digital signature provides authentication based
on the ownership of a particular private key and its associated public key. How-
ever, the verifying node must be able to link that valid public key with an actual
identity so it can provide operator authentication.
As stated before, a typical method for linking public keys with identities is the
use of digital certicates. However, during the analysis chapter (x6) we decided
to reject them for our design, due to their implementation and management
cost. Consequently, we decided to rely on the existent Active Directory (AD)
infrastructure for managing operators' public keys, linked to their identities on
the AD server.
Asymmetric keys are designed to be in place for long periods of time (months
or years). However, private keys should not be stored remotely and operators
should not need to manage their key pairs. Thus, if an operator uses dierent
workstations and keys are long term, one public key would need to be stored
for each user and workstation. Moreover, in case of key compromise, revocation
procedures would be needed for removing compromised keys.
Thus, in our solution key pairs are ephemeral, expiring after short periods of
time (hours). Thus, since keys are short term, special revocation procedures are
not needed, as keys they expire after hours, like Kerberos tickets.
However, operators may need to log in to various workstations at the same
time (i.e. night shift sta). As a result, our design considers the possibility of
simultaneously storing multiple keys for the same user. Keys would be removed
by operator's applications when they log o.
Nevertheless, should sessions not be terminated graciously, old public keys may
remain in the AD. If this situation occurs often, public key lists would become
intractable, unnecessarily extending the verication process. Thus, a periodic
purge of expired public keys in AD servers is recommended.
7.2.1 Credential management server and schema modications
A trusted server is needed in order to store public keys linked to their owners
identities. Since AD servers are already present at current deployments and
they store user credentials, they were selected for managing public keys. Thus,
our design is targeted to those servers. However, it would work with other
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directory or database technologies (e.g. LDAP7, SQL8), providing that they
can authenticate operators.
If an AD server is used for storing user public keys, some changes on the Active
Directory schema are needed. Particularly, the User class, whose objects rep-
resent a user of of the domain, needs to have an additional eld. This eld is a
used to store operators' credentials.
Writing permissions of the public key eld in the User object must be limited
to the user that is represented by that object. Only by guaranteeing that just
the user can write its own public key, the association between the public key
and the user's identity can be trusted.
On the other hand, even if public keys were available to every domain user,
security would be guaranteed, as public keys are design to be published. How-
ever, following the principle of least privilege, the reading access of the public
keys should be limited to the owning user and to service accounts of the servers
that verify digital signatures. Nevertheless, reading privileges may be extended
if the proposed authentication scheme is used for purposes beyond the ones it
is being designed for.
In addition, the creation date of each public key must also be recorded in the
AD. An extra eld could be created for this purpose, but to ensure the atomicity
of writing operations, the same eld is used in our design. The particular format
for storing the key and the time stamp together will be discussed during the
implementation phase.
The expiration date of the key could be used instead of the creation one. Never-
theless, the latter reduces the likeliness of implementation errors at the verifying
nodes, since it enforces by design that the calculation of the valid time window
is done by the verifying node.
Finally, it is common for organizations to have more than one AD server, estab-
lishing synchronization between them. This process can increment time needed
for a public key to be available to verifying servers once a user publish it. Dur-
ing the implementation phase, our solution will be tested in dierent mock AD
deployments and possible mitigations for this problem will be evaluated.
7.2.2 Signing node
In order to sign the messages they send, workstations need to have access to the
operator's private keys. If the key pair is not cached in the operator workstation
(i.e. the user has just logged in) or has expired, it needs to be generated.
During the implementation phase dierent asymmetric key algorithms will be
tested. RSA is interesting due to its low verication time while ECDSA is fast
for key generation and signing. However, regardless of the chosen algorithm,
the overall functioning is the same.
Once the key is generated, the public key has to be uploaded to the appropriate
eld of the operator's User object. The creation date and time of the key must
7Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP)
8Structured Query Language (SQL)
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be stored together with the key itself. As stated before, this time stamp provides
a method for enforcing key expiration.
After the key pair has been generated and the public uploaded to the credential
management server, messages can be signed with the private key. The key pair
is removed after the expiration time is reached or when the operator logs o.
7.2.3 Verifying node
When a server (i.e. SCADA) receives a command request, the message signature
must be validated and linked with the operator's identity. In order to perform
this verication, the server must know the valid public keys of the command
issuer.
Operators send their identities in the signed part of their messages. Thus, by
reading them, verifying nodes can obtain the alleged identity of the command
issuer. Messages also include the public key linked to the private key used for
signing. This key must not be used for verication, but provides a fast method
for identifying which public key from the operator key list is to be used for
verication.
If no public keys are cached for that operator, they do not match the public key
in the message or they have expired, the current list of public keys needs to be
fetched. Once the list updated, any failure in the verication process must be
considered nal.
Regardless of the triggering event, the key fetching process is the same. Using
the AD interface for accessing the AD data, the server requests the values of the
public key list for the alleged user identity. Once downloaded, the list is parsed
and each public key and its time stamp cached and used for the any pending
verication operation.
Finally, once the list of public keys is fetched, each key can be used unlimitedly
during its validity period. Updating the list is only necessary when verication
fails or if all the keys expire.
7.3 Requirement fullment
7.3.1 Architecture constraints
Our solution can be implemented in the current architecture with no signicant
modications. Commands are still requested using Remote Procedure Calls
(RPCs) and node-to-node connections protected by Kerberos tunnels.
The operator account is only used for connecting their workstation with the
rst access server. However, as with the existent architecture, when access
servers forward command request they use service accounts for authentication.
On top of that existing architecture, our design provides end-to-end operator
authentication and non-repudiation.
Firstly, the Active Directory schema needs to be modied to be able to store
operators' public keys, guaranteeing that the link between operator identities
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and their public keys is trustworthy.
Moreover, verifying and signing nodes also require modications. The former
need to be able to read public keys from the AD server and to use them to
validate digital signatures. They also have to store into a log the issuer identity
and the request description for each command to provide non-repudiation. Sim-
ilarly, signing nodes must create key pairs, store public keys in the appropriate
eld at the AD server and include a signed part in command requests.
Finally, in the current architecture, command requests are likely to be modied
in transit by access servers. This behaviour is still present, but the signature and
its payload must be maintained unchanged end-to-end. ABB current protocols
provide methods for introducing additional data (i.e. text strings) in RPCs.
Using them, it is possible to provide the signature information to the verifying
nodes with no important architectural changes.
7.3.2 Security requirements
The existent architecture ensures authentication, condentiality and integrity in
node-to-node connections. As a result, when command requests are forwarded,
the trust lies in the forwarding nodes (access servers), that inform about the
requesting operator identity.
The main purpose of our design is to provide authentication end-to-end, inde-
pendent of the middle servers. Thus, even if an access server is compromised,
SCADA servers (or any other receiving nodes) can authenticate the command
issuer and provide non-repudiation.
However, in current deployments, command authorization is not managed by
the SCADA server itself, but by access servers. They authenticate and authorize
commands, by deciding if they are forwarded or discarded, depending on the
requested action and on the permissions of the requesting operator. SCADA
servers only authenticate incoming commands, but they do not provide autho-
rization.
Moving command authorization from access servers to SCADA servers may be
possible. Nevertheless, it falls out of the scope of this thesis. It would also
reduce the capabilities of access servers and, consequently, the exibility of the
whole architecture.
Thus, our design does not ensure proper command authorization in case of
access server compromise. As with the current architecture, access servers au-
thenticate and authorize commands, while the SCADA server only guarantees
that command issuers are authenticated.
Therefore, should an access server be compromised, command-request authenti-
cation would still be valid, but privilege escalation attacks would be possible. In
other words, if a low-privilege operator manages to compromise an access server,
they would be able run commands without being authorized. However, even if
that were the case, their actions would be logged, linked to their authenticated
identities.
Moreover, condentiality is guaranteed in node-to-node connections by the Ker-
beros tunnels already used by the current architecture. In addition, our design
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provides end-to-end integrity protection for the signed parts of the command
requests.
In addition, our solution also provides additional protection against replay or
delay attacks. By including a time stamp and a nonce in the signed part of the
command requests, delayed or replayed messages can be detected, logged and
discarded.
Finally, with this design, trust lies in the AD server. Thus, domain administra-
tors can impersonate any user by adding their own public key to the AD. This
risk can be mitigated by logging administrator actions, but not eliminated. As
discussed during the analysis, all solutions trust a credential management server
to some extent, and are vulnerable to its compromise.
7.3.3 Performance requirements
The established performance requirements state that the CPU usage and latency
impact of our solution must be as low as possible.
In terms of CPU usage, the eect of deploying our design is not expected to be
signicant. Signing and verifying nodes would be the most aected ones, due
to the computational cost of asymmetric-key cryptography operations. How-
ever, as denoted during the analysis (x6.4), modern computers can manage
asymmetric-key cryptography with no signicant impact in computational re-
source utilization.
Moreover, standard key length requirements for public-key cryptography are
established for long term use of the keys. Thus, key length recommendations,
issued by advising bodies, can be relaxed in our design. A high level of security
would still be provided, due to the ephemeral nature of the keys in our solution.
Similarly, latency impact per message would be aected by signing and verica-
tion operations. Nevertheless, modern computers can perform asymmetric-key
operations, not only with low CPU usage impact, but also with insignicant
eects in latency.
However, our design may aect initial latency after an operator logs in. In
infrastructures with multiple AD servers, synchronization operations must be
performed, in order for directory data to be consistent across all AD servers.
These operations can take several minutes. Thus, since the operator's public
key stored in the AD directory must be available for the verifying nodes, the
time window since an operator logs in and until they are able to send commands
can be severely aected.
During the implementation stage, the eect of this initial latency will be evalu-
ated. Moreover, mitigations for these potential delays will be explored.
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8 Implementation
In order to prove the validity of design, a prototype implementation has been
produced. This chapter discusses how it was created, covering the installation
scripts for the AD Server and the applications for the verifying and signing
nodes.
8.1 AD Server
8.1.1 Adding a eld for storing operator public keys
By default, AD controllers do not allow the modication of the schema. In order
to be able to do so, a key must be added to the Windows registry on the AD
domain controller.
Afterwards, the attribute for storing the public keys must be added. We decided
that the attribute must be multi-valued, so it can store several public keys.
Moreover, keys can be stored as text strings (ASCII, Unicode). However, binary
formats require less space and remove the need for conversion. Thus, since users
do not need to read the keys themselves, they are directly stored in binary
format, using the AD type octet string.
Once this attribute is created, it needs to be part of the user class, which
represents a user of the domain. Nevertheless, instead of adding it directly to
the class, an auxiliary class is created, and the attribute added to it. Then, the
new class is set as auxiliary for the user class, that inherits the attribute.
Having the auxiliary class as owner of the attribute provides more exibility if
further modications are required. Moreover, the class is an indicator of the
changes on the schema, helping in potential subsequent modications or audits.
In addition, Active Directory elements (attributes and classes) are identied by
and Object IDentier (OID). OIDs can be divided in two parts: a base OID that
identies the owning organization; and the element OID, linked to a particular
element of that organization. Base OIDs can be requested from Microsoft for
testing purposes; but, for production environments, they should be issued by a
ISO-member organization [59].
Furthermore, all custom elds in the AD schema must have a prex that iden-
ties the owning organization. It provides a method for easily identifying the
owner of the custom elds, without needing to verify the base OID registration.
A PowerShell script is provided for performing the previously explained opera-
tions. It enables schema modications, creates the attribute and the auxiliary
class in the AD, and sets the new class to be auxiliary of the system-default
user class.
The script requires a prex and a base OID as parameters, in order to apply
them to the class and attribute to be created. Moreover, it also accepts the
element OID for the new class and attribute as parameters. If they are not
passed, 1.1 is used for identifying the new class and 2.1 for the attribute.
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8.1.2 Writing permissions of the public key eld
By default, only domain administrators can modify the new attribute of the
user class. In order for our solution to work, each user must be able to write
its own public key on the public key eld of its user object.
Domain administrators must delegate the control over the new attribute to the
users. The SELF user represents the user linked to a particular user object.
By giving writing permissions to SELF, each user is be able to write or delete
its public keys on the AD, but not the ones of the rest of users.
However, domain administrators are still able to write in the public key eld of
every user. By design, AD administrators have full privileges over their domain.
Thus, the best way to mitigate the risks involved with this approach is to limit
the number of domain administrators (least privilege policies), protect their
credentials, and log all their actions in the system.
8.1.3 Reading permissions of the public key eld
By default, reading permissions are granted to all authenticated users. Even
though this is enough for guaranteeing the validity of digital signatures, it should
be extended as dened in the design chapter. Particularly, reading permissions
for the public key should be limited to the owning user and service accounts.
For implementing this policy, a general rule that blocks reading attempts to
every user must be set, together with a more specic rule that allows access to
particular users. The main limitation of the AD for this approach is that deny
rules take precedence over allow ones.
However, rules set higher in the hierarchy are superseded by those dened in
lower levels. Thus, a workaround for this constraint lies in setting the deny rule
on a AD element higher in the hierarchy than the one where the allow rule is
set. For instance, if the allow rule is set on a User container, the deny rule can
be established on the Organizational Unit (OU) or on the domain.
Following these guidelines, a deny rule must be set for the group Everyone, that
represents all the domain users (including those who are not authenticated).
Then, allow rules must be dened for the user that owns the public key eld
and for the service accounts. The former can be established while setting writing
permissions, while the latter should be applied to a group of users that contains
all the service accounts.
8.1.4 Purging obsolete keys
Even though the signing application removes keys from the AD when the user
logs out, sessions may not always be closed graciously. Should that be the
case, expired keys would remain in the AD. Their presence would not have any
security implications, since they would be discarded by the verifying node when
checking its time validity. However, a great number of keys per user would lead
to an increment in the time needed to nd the correct public key.
In order to relieve signing nodes from checking the state of the key list for their
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users, the server can periodically remove expired keys. The frequency of the
key purging operation may vary depending on the particular characteristics of
each deployment, being a weekly run appropriate in most cases: It is frequent
enough to avoid long key lists, while it can be run on server valley times for
avoiding unwanted eects in other servers.
A Powershell script CleanExpiredPublicKeys.ps1 is provided. When executed,
it veries all public keys for all domain users and removes those which are not
within their validity period. This script can be set as a task in the domain
controller to be run periodically by the system.
8.1.5 Domain controller replication
In order to provide redundancy or for sharing the same AD infrastructure among
dierent sites, AD replication can be established. Depending on the the location
of the controllers and on the conguration, synchronization times may vary from
seconds to hours.
Should operators connect to a dierent controller than receiving nodes (i.e.
SCADA) server, replication delays may have a signicant eect in the latency
of our solution. However, eects dier depending on the conguration of the
controllers. For instance, if they are logically located in the same site, replication
of changes has a latency of approximately 15 seconds.
On the other hand, if controllers are congured in dierent logical sites, syn-
chronization is done every 3 hours by default. This frequency can be modied,
but the minimum value is 15 minutes. Obviously, a 15 minute delay since a user
logs until the receiving end is able to verify their messages is not acceptable.
One alternative to address this limitation relies on modifying the conguration
of the link between sites. The USE NOTIFY option can be switched on. If
enabled, domain controllers issue notications when changes are performed on
the AD, triggering a synchronization with the rest of the controllers.
Thus, should the USE NOTIFY option be enabled, changes would be propa-
gated as if nodes were in the same logical site, having a latency after login of a
approximately 15 seconds (without considering link delays). However, since this
option is not targeted to a particular AD class or attribute, replication would
be triggered with every AD modication. Therefore, in cases where the link
between sites has bandwidth limitations, it could lead to network congestion
and create inconsistencies between controllers.
As a result, another option has been explored. It relies on triggering AD repli-
cation with log events. By enabling auditing on the public-keys eld of the user
objects, an event is generated every time a key is written for a user.
Windows events can be used, not only for auditing purposes, but also for trig-
gering tasks. Particularly, a task can be triggered by write-access events on the
active directory. These events include a eld called Properties that has three
Globally Unique IDentiers (GUIDs). Two of them are default identiers, that
do not dier depending on the object or attribute modied. However, the other
one identies the attribute that has been modied.
As a result, selecting only those events that have the appropriate GUID is
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crucial for running the replication process only when needed. Nevertheless,
Windows event ltering is based on a limited version of XML Path Language
(XPath), that only lters strings with exact matches. Moreover, the properties
eld includes hidden characters (e.g. line breaks) that are dicult to match,
and whose syntax may vary depending on the system.
Therefore, a task is triggered for every write operation on the AD, regardless
of which attribute was written. It executes a PowerShell script that receives
the event information and decides whether the event represents the writing of
a public key on a user object. If that is the case, a replication operation will be
executed for that user object.
This solution is more complex in terms of implementation than the USE NOTIFY
switch. Furthermore, it could aect log size if many write operations are per-
formed on the AD. However, it provides a ner-grained triggering for synchro-
nization, avoiding the link congestion that too many replication operations may
cause.
8.2 Signing node
Our implementation for the signing node provides signing of commands and
manages the associated public key in the Active Directory. Moreover, a sim-
ple socket client was implemented for simulating the communication with the
verication node.
Furthermore, at ABB, most operator workstations run Windows. Thus, our im-
plementation for these nodes is targeted for that operating system. Particularly,
it relies on the .NET Framework and the C# language.
The .NET Framework is installed by default in the latest Windows version,
and available for installation in older versions of the operating system. It pro-
vides Graphical User Interface (GUI) capabilities by the use of forms (Windows
Forms) and includes implementations of cryptography functions.
Two versions of the client application have been implemented, one that uses
ECDSA and another that relies in RSA. Having dierent applications for each
signing algorithm facilitates the enforcement of one of them, by distributing the
appropriate application to clients.
Moreover, the support of ECDSA in older versions of the .NET Framework is
limited. Thus the ECDSA variant of our application needs at least version 4.7 of
the .NET Framework. On the other hand, the RSA variant is compatible with
version 4.0 and higher. Therefore, should workstations have obsolete versions
of the .NET Framework, the RSA variant of the client application can be used.
As stated before, the client application relies in Windows Forms to provide
a graphical interface. Particularly, the application GUI is divided into three
forms:
 Login. Key pair generation and uploading of the public key to the Active
Directory
 Connection. Binding to the server running at the verifying node
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 Messaging. Sending of signed messages to the server
8.2.1 Active Directory connection (Login)
The Login window has only one button for starting the login operation. As
Figure 8 shows, this form also states the identity under which the user will be
logged in. When the user logs in, their public key is stored in the AD, linked to
their identity. Conversely, when a user logs out, the public key for that session
is removed from the AD and the local object that contains discarded.
Figure 8: Login form of the signing application
Internally, the application uses an interface that exposes the methods use by
the form. Figure 9 shows a diagram of the interface and its implementation.
The UploadKey and RemoveKey methods are to be called when logging in and
logging out, respectively. Conversely, GetIdentity returns the identity to be
used in the logging in process
SigningAppTest.exe
SigningAppTest
ADPublicKeyUploader
IPublicKeyUploader
PublicKeyUploadingException
UploadKey GetIdentity
RemoveKey
Figure 9: Key management classes of the signing application
The use of an interface provides an easy method for replacing the key manage-
ment method, since the login and signing process would work with any valid
implementation of the interface. Our particular implementation relies on the
active directory for storing the public keys, as discussed in the design chapter
(x7).
The identity of the user is not its user name, but its Security IDentier (SID).
Using an unique identier guarantees that the the public key is stored for the
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Time stamp Key data (Microsoft BLOB)
(8 bytes) (n bytes)
Figure 10: Common public key format
Time stamp Key type Key size X Y
(8 bytes) (4 bytes) (4 bytes) (32 bytes) (32 bytes)
Figure 11: Public key format (ECDSA with curve NIST P-256)
correct user. It also forces the verifying node to obtain the human-readable user
identity from the AD for logging purposes, ensuring its correctness.
For adding or removing a key to a user, the related object must be retrieved
from the AD. The .NET library includes tools for performing such operation
(System.DirectoryServices). By providing the user SID, the related directory
entry can be obtained, and keys added or removed.
Due to the usage of the .NET library for signing messages, the public key can
only be exported in Microsoft's proprietary format. Additionally, when the
SignatureManager exports a key, it includes its creation time stamp. It is stored
in milliseconds since the (Unix) epoch in a 64-bit integer, stored in big-endian
format (the most signicant bit is stored rst).
As discussed during the design chapter (x7), having a time stamp provides a
method for discarding old keys. The general structure of exported public keys,
common for RSA and ECDSA, is shown in Figure 10.
ECDSA key format When using ECDSA, the key is expressed as the coor-
dinates of a point in the elliptic curve. It is exported together with an identier
of the key type, and a value that represents the length of each coordinate of the
key. Figure 11 shows how the data is formatted when ECDSA keys are stored
in the AD.
Our implementation relies on the P-256 elliptic curve, dened by the NIST [60].
As discussed in x2.4.3, it provides a high level of security, even for long-term
keys. Since in our design keys are expected to last for short periods of time, the
architecture would still be secure with shorter ECDSA keys.
However, the selected curve was chosen because it is compatible both with
the .NET Framework and with the Python ECDSA library of the verifying
application. Moreover, according to the ECRYPT II benchmarks [7], it is the
fastest ECDSA curve in terms of key generation, signing and verication; even
when compared to shorter ones.
RSA key format In order to be compatible with older .NET Framework
versions, and to compare the performance of RSA and ECDSA, we also provide
an RSA based implementation of the signing application. Key generation and
message signing is expected to be slower than with ECDSA, but verication
faster, reducing the load of the verifying node.
56
Time stamp PUBLICKEYSTRUCT RSAPUBKEY modulus
(8 bytes) (8 bytes) (12 bytes) (1024 bits / 128 bytes)
Figure 12: Public key format (RSA 1024 bit)
BLOB type BLOB version reserved Algortihm ID Padding
0x06 0x02 0x00 0x0000a400 0x00
(1 byte) (1 byte) (1 byte) (4 byte) (1 byte)
Figure 13: Public key format (RSA 1024 bit): PUBLICKEYSTRUCT
The short term nature of our keys reduces the time window for brute-force
attacks. Thus, even though RSA-3072 could be considered an equivalent of
ECDSA P-256, we have selected RSA-1024. Using shorter keys, reduces the
computational cost of cryptographic operations.
Moreover, as stated in x2.4.4, the longer RSA key to be broken was a 786 bit
one, and it took several years. Thus, we consider that a RSA 1024 bit key pair
is more than enough for our architecture, since keys will expire in days or hours.
RSA keys are also stored in the AD with their time stamp, according to the
format dened in Figure 10. However, the .NET RSA library exports keys
with more metadata than its ECDSA counterpart. It includes a PUBLICK-
EYSTRUCT structure, that identies the blob as an RSA public key blob; a
RSAPUBKEY structure, that denes the public key format; and the modulus.
Figures 12,13 and 14 cover the format of RSA public keys stored in the AD and
sent over the network.
8.2.2 Socket client (Connect)
Our implementation is targeted for ABB proprietary communication protocols.
However, since our focus is on message signing and verication, setting up our
implementation for all ABB communication protocols falls out of the scope of
this thesis.
Thus, a simple client-server architecture has been created for modelling message
passing between nodes. Particularly, the signing node implements a socket-
based TCP client, that connects to the receiving end for exchanging messages.
Connections are started by the user from the Connect form (Figure 15). The
user needs to write the server address and port to start a TCP connection to it.
Key type (Magic ID) Bit count Public exponent
0x52534131 1024 (0x00040000) [Dynamic value]
(4 byte) (4 byte) (4 byte)
Figure 14: Public key format (RSA 1024 bit): RSAPUBKEY
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Figure 15: Connect form of the signing application
Internally, the socket server works asynchronously, guaranteeing that the inter-
face stays responsive, even when the application is working on the background.
When a connection is established, the GUI switches to the Messaging form, that
provides message sending capabilities.
8.2.3 Signature (Messaging)
Once the user's public key is stored in the AD controller and a connection
with the receiving server has been established, signed messages can be sent to
the server from the Messaging form (Figure 16). It provides a text box for
sending messages and shows information about what is sent to the server and
its response.
Internally, the SignatureManager class provides the means to sign messages,
relying on the .NET cryptographic libraries. It also stores the key pair used for
issuing signed messages and provides access to the public key.
When the user wants to send a message, a the signature payload is created. It
includes the message (the command description in the target architecture), a
time stamp, a nonce and the identity of the sending user. For compatibility rea-
sons, the time stamp is stored in milliseconds since the (Unix) epoch. Moreover,
the identity is the user Security IDentier (SID) of the sender.
Afterwards, the signature payload is converted to a JavaScript Object Notation
(JSON) and signed with the private key. The JSON format was chosen for
being compatible with most programming languages. Moreover, being human
readable aids in understanding the functioning of the application when sending
and receiving messages. Nevertheless, in order to increase performance, a byte
based format may be created, reducing the size of the data sent over the network
and removing the need of performing JSON parsing operations.
Subsequently, a signed message is sent to the receiving end. It is a JSON object
that includes the signature payload, the signature, and the associated public
key. The public key is sent without its time stamp, since it is only needed for
selecting the appropriate key from the AD, where keys have the time stamp
appended.
Finally, the application waits for the response from the receiving node. Once
received, it is shown in the GUI to the user (Figure 16).
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Figure 16: Messaging form of the signing application
8.3 Verifying node
The verication application is a socket server that accepts connections from
clients. Once client is connected to the server, their messages messages are
parsed. Particularly, the sender alleged identity and public key are read and
compared against the keys for that user in the Active Directory. Once the valid
public key is retrieved, it is used to verify the signature payload. Finally a
response is sent to the client, indicating if the message was validated.
Python was selected for implementing this application, due to its simplicity and
compatibility with most Linux systems. Moreover, there are Python libraries for
connecting to the AD (LDAP protocol) and implementations of cryptographic
functions (RSA and ECDSA). Although Python 3.6 version was selected ini-
tially, due to compatibility limitations in ABB target systems, Python 2.7 is
the nal choice. Furthermore, since ECDSA and RSA libraries were not in-
stalled in ABB test system, we include them with our implementation.
In addition, even though we consider Python a good choice for demonstrating
our design, real implementations could benet from using more ecient pro-
gramming languages, such as C/C++. They oer better performance, since
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they provide a ner-grained computing resource management and are compiled
before running.
8.3.1 Key retrieval from the AD
The key provider.py module exposes the PublicKeyManager class, for providing
access to the AD public keys. Particularly, it stores a list of keys for each user
in a dictionary and updates it when needing by connecting to the AD.
The get validated public key method, receives the alleged sender's identity and
public key of a message and tries to nd it on the cache. If the key is not
found the cache entry for that identity is updated, and the process repeated
again. If no valid key is found or the key is not within its validity period, an
exception is thrown. Otherwise, the valid key is returned, with the time stamp
data removed.
The connection to the Active Directory is managed by the ADPublicKeyProvider
class, that binds to the selected domain controller when instantiated (when the
program starts running). The credentials for the bind operation are requested
to the user running the application, while the rest of parameters needed (LDAP
address of the domain controller, domain name and the name of the attribute
that stores the list of public keys) are read from a JSON conguration le.
When a list of keys is requested to an ADPublicKeyProvider object, the associ-
ated user element is retrieved from the AD, using its Security IDentier (SID)
as a lter. From that object, the list of keys for the user is return, together
with the human-readable name of the user. Even though the SID is better for
performing searches due to its uniqueness, we consider that the name of the user
is more interesting for logging purposes, since it provides a faster identication
of the sender when reading the logs.
8.3.2 Key parsing
Regardless of the cryptographic algorithm (RSA or ECDSA), the Python li-
braries our implementation relies on do not support the Microsoft BLOB for-
mat used by the signing applications. Thus, a conversion must be made before
running any cryptographic operations.
Firstly, algorithm needs to be identied. Currently, our server only supports
RSA and ECDSA P-256 . Once a key is validated, its headers are checked for
deciding which algorithm is being used.
ECDSA keys are recognized by their key type eld, a magic ID dene by Mi-
crosoft. Particularly, P-256 keys have the 0x31534345 value that represents the
BCRYPT ECDH PUBLIC P256 MAGIC type and is stored in little-endian for-
mat (bytes in reverse order).
Once an ECDSA P-256 key is recognised, it is expected to have a key size value
of 32 (32 bytes = 256 bit). Then, the coordinates of the key (a point in the
curve) are read and used for generating a verifying-key object.
Conversely, RSA keys are identied by their PUBLICKEYSTRUCT structure
(Figure 13) and the key type in the RSAPUBKEY structure (Figure 14).
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Verifying-key objects for RSA are created by reading their bit count and public
exponent. The modulus length is calculated depending on the value on the bit
count eld. Thus, even though it has not been tested, it should work with any
key lengths compatible with the Python RSA library in place.
Finally, regardless of the algorithm, verifying-key objects (from the CustomECD-
SAVerifyingKey or CustomRSAVerifyingKey classes) expose a verify method
that receives a message and a signature and raises an exception if verication
fails.
8.3.3 Validation of signed messages
When a message is received from the server, it is passed to the verifyMessage
method of VerifyingManager object, created when the application is started.
The JSON data that contains the signed message information is parsed, ob-
taining the signature payload, the signature, and the alleged public key. The
payload has to be parsed too for retrieving the alleged user identity.
Afterwards, the key is validated, by calling the get validated public key method
of the PublicKeyManager. If the key provided by the user is validated (in terms
of validity time and presence in the AD), it is used for creating a verifying-key
object, as described in the previous section (x8.3.2).
Finally, using that object, the signature payload is veried. A message is sent
back to the client, stating whether the verication process was successful. On
the contrary, should errors occur during this process, the response would include
information about the particular error cause.
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9 Performance evaluation
Apart from proving the viability of our design, the implementation also provides
a means for producing a limited performance evaluation. Particularly, we mea-
sured the time needed by ABB testing systems for performing cryptographic
operations. Moreover, the latency for message passing and for synchronization
of the list of public keys between Active Directory controllers has also been
studied.
The test environment consists in one Windows client, one Linux server (i.e. the
SCADA server) and two AD domain controllers. Table 7 shows the specications
of those systems.
All of them run in virtual machines managed by VMware's ESXi, a type-1
hypervisor9. Type-1 hypervisors (also called native or bare-metal), are those
that run directly on hardware, controlling it and having more exibility when
managing guest systems.
9.1 Cryptographic operations
Even though modern processors have reduced the time needed for performing
cryptographic operations, their impact must be studied; not only for assess-
ing the potential deployment of this solution on ABB systems, but also for
comparing the performance of RSA and ECDSA. Measurements were obtained
in terms of time needed for performing cryptographic operations in ABB test
environment.
9.1.1 Key generation (Signing node)
When a user logs in, the application generates a key pair and uploads the public
key to the AD. The time required for performing key generation, together with
AD replication times in some cases, is important for predicting login times.
Table 8 presents the mean, median and standard deviation for the time measure-
ments retrieved after 10000 key generation operations. Values where measured
using .NET Stopwatch function.
9hypervisor: Virtual machine monitor. Creates and runs virtual machines.
Table 7: Testing system technical specications
Signing node Domain controller Verifying node
Architecture 64 bit 64 bit 64 bit
Processor 2 x 2.60Hz 2 x 2.60Hz 2 x 2.60Hz
RAM 4 GB 2 GB 8 GB
Operating system Windows 10
(1607)
Windows Server
2012 R2
Red Hat Enterprise
Linux Server 7.3 (Maipo)
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Table 8: Key generation time in milliseconds (10000-element sample)
Mean Median Standard deviation
ECDSA P-256 0.2145 0.2159 0.0616
RSA 1024 bit 11.013 9.4483 6.5899
Table 9: Message hashing and signing time in milliseconds for 100-byte messages
(10000-element sample)
Mean Median Standard deviation
ECDSA P-256 0.1199 0.1097 0.0265
RSA 1024 bit 0.2834 0.2718 0.0044
9.1.2 Signature generation (Signing node)
Every message that a user sends to the verifying node must be signed. Thus,
the time needed for performing signing operations must be measured, since it
aects the latency of every command request issued by the operator. These
measurements include not only the signing of the message hash, but also the
generation of that hash digest. Separate measurements are not available, since
libraries perform both operations within the same function call. Table 9 presents
the mean, median and standard deviation for the time measurements retrieved
after 1000 key generation operations.
9.1.3 Signature verication (Verifying node)
Every message received at the verifying node must be veried, to decide whether
it is valid. Just as signature generation, verication operations aect the latency
of every sent message. Moreover, Python libraries also perform hashing of the
message contents and signature verication within the same function. Thus,
values presented in Table 10 measure both operations as if they were one. Times
were measured using the time function of the Python time module, that provides
accurate system clock readings in Linux systems.
9.2 Message passing
Latency in key upload and retrieval depends mainly on the network that con-
nects the nodes and on protocols used by ABB to forward command request and
responses. Thus, message passing latency is greatly aected by factors that are
external to the application and can vary from one particular target architecture
to another.
Table 10: Message hashing and verication time in milliseconds for 100-byte
messages (1000-element sample)
Mean Median Standard deviation
ECDSA P-256 89.462 84.824 14.195
RSA 1024 bit 0.1354 0.1221 0.0383
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Table 11: Active Directory public key propagation times
AD environment
Propagation/Replication time
Controller Site Conguration
Same - Default 0s
Dierent
Same Default 15s
Dierent USE NOTIFY 15s
Dierent Default 180 min. (minimum 15 min.)
Any Event-triggered replication 4 1 s (6 1 s after boot)
Moreover in our prototype message passing is done using a socket client-server
architecture, dierent from ABB RPC protocols. Therefore, the latency of
the communication in the test architecture is not applicable to the production
environment.
Nevertheless, we can measure the overhead that our application produces when
sending signed messages. It provides any potential user of our solution a method
for predicting latency in their own architecture. Results showed that the over-
head is of 522  2 bytes per message when using RSA-1024 and 334  2 when
using ECDSA P-256.
9.3 Key retrieval delay
As with message passing, measurements of key retrieval and storing latency
would not provide signicant data, as they depend on the network and on the
Active Directory communication protocols.
Nevertheless, when the AD domain controller is not shared by the signing and
verifying nodes, the delay since a user logs in (uploads it public key) until their
key is available for verifying nodes does not depend only on network delays.
On the contrary, they are mainly dependant on the Active Directory replication
times. These times have not been measured exactly, since they are aected by
the inherent unpredictability of network environments and are therefore hard to
measure condently. However, default values were obtained from bibliography
and those that were not available were measured producing approximate values.
When domain controllers are logically located on the same site, their default
synchronization time is of 15 seconds [61]. On the other hand, when controllers
are congured in dierent sites, their replication times are longer: by default
180 minutes, being possible to reduce it to no less than 15 minutes.
In x8.1.5 we proposed two methods for reducing this delay, namely setting the
USE NOTIFY option or using the event log to trigger targeted replication. The
former needs 15 seconds for replication [61], as measurements conrmed. Con-
versely, event-triggered replication was faster than the USE NOTIFY option,
making the key available in 4  1 seconds, except the rst time after system
boot, when the delay was of 6 1 seconds.
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10 Discussion
The design and consequent implementation presented in this thesis provide a
solution that fulls the requirements established in x5. This chapter explains
how these requirements are meet in terms of compatibility with the target ar-
chitecture, security and performance.
10.1 Compatibility with the target architecture
Our design is compatible with the target architecture with minimal deployment
costs. Moreover, our implementation has not been tested on real production
environments. However, ABB RPC protocols provide methods for sending text
content attached to command requests. Thus, since communication between
signing and verifying node is message based, our implementation can be applied
to the target architecture by using the text eld in ABB protocols as a means
of communication between nodes.
Moreover, changes would be needed on the applications at the workstations and
at the receiving nodes (e.g. SCADA servers), since they need to be able to sign
and verify messages respectively. Furthermore, Active Directory schema must
be modied in order to provide identity management to our solution.
Our implementation has proven the viability of applying our design in terms
of signing and verifying messages and using the AD for identity management.
Moreover, there is practically no extra maintenance cost, as key purging oper-
ations can be done automatically.
Furthermore, there is no need for extra credential management, since identities
are managed by the Active Directory as they were before and the short term
nature of our key pairs removes the need for credential revocation in case of key
compromise (although it could be done if needed).
Finally our implementation does not incur in extra costs, as it does not need
extra hardware and it is based on software that is already present on the infras-
tructure or that is freely available.
10.2 Security
Our solution relies on digital signatures for providing message source authenti-
cation and non-repudiation, together with Active Directory for linking identities
and public keys. Moreover, time stamps and nonces are used for avoiding replay
and delay attacks.
10.2.1 Digital signatures
As stated in x2.5.1, digital signatures are the most common cryptographic solu-
tion for guaranteeing authentication and non-repudiation. The level of security
they provide is mainly dependant on the public key algorithm used for generat-
ing and verifying them. In our implementation, we selected ECDSA P-256 and
RSA 1024 bit. The former is recommended by the ECRYPT group as appro-
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priate for long term usage, and thus it exceeds the security requirements of our
solution (keys are short term).
Conversely, both the NIST and the ECRYPT group state that RSA keys must
be 3072 bit long for long term applications. However, since our keys are to be
valid only for hours or days, requirements can be relaxed, as the time window for
brute force attacks is reduced in comparison with long term usage. Particularly,
we selected a 1024 bit length because, while it provides better performance, the
longest RSA key to be broken was 768 bit long (and researchers needed several
years to break it).
In any case, this particular choices of key lengths for RSA and ECDSA may
become obsolete over time, as computing evolves. Thus, they will need to be
updated accordingly to maintain the security of the solution. Particularly, it
is important to keep track of the advances in quantum computing, as these
technology could be able to broke both algorithms in the future. Should that
be the case, alternative algorithms could replace RSA or ECDSA, as discussed
in x2.4.4.
10.2.2 Active Directory for identity management
In order to reduce implementation and maintenance costs, the Active Directory
is used for storing user public keys. This directory is already present in the
target architecture and manages user identities. Thus, as proved during the
implementation, it can be used for storing the public keys needed by our solution
with minor modications on its schema.
The use of the AD for storing public keys has already been explored by system
administrators. Particularly, several online resources reported having used it
for storing SSH public keys [62][63][64] or PGP public keys [65].
However, relying on the Active Directory for credential management of digital
signatures has a downside: It becomes a Single Point Of Failure (SPOF) in
terms of attacks. If any of the controllers is compromised, an attacker would
be able to write its own public keys and use the credentials of any user on
the domain. Thus, protecting Active Directory domain controllers must be a
priority for maintaining the security of the architecture.
Moreover, domain administrators have virtually no limitations to write in the
AD. Thus, they can write their own public keys on any user, consequently
being able to impersonate them. Therefore, their accounts must be specially
protected. In addition, logging of writing events on the AD can be enabled, not
only for protection against hacked accounts, but also for detecting malicious
actions by rogue employees.
10.2.3 Peculiarities of the target system
Communications are already protected by Kerberos tunnels in the target archi-
tecture, guaranteeing node-to-node condentiality, authentication and integrity
protection. On top of that architecture, our solution provides end-to-end au-
thentication and integrity for the signed messages.
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The authentication guaranteed by digital signatures, together with the iden-
tity management provided by the Active Directory, ensures non-repudiation of
command requests, since they can be linked to a particular user. Since authen-
tication is provided end-to-end, this association between user and command
request is to be trusted even in the event of access server compromise.
However, as stated in x7.3.2, our solution does not provide authorization of
commands. The evaluation of the privileges when a user runs a command is
performed by the access servers, which forward or discard a command depending
on the permissions of the user.
Thus, as with the current architecture, command authorization in our solution
depends on the access servers.They authenticate and authorize commands, while
the SCADA server only guarantees that command issuers are authenticated.
Therefore, should a low-privilege operator manage to compromise an access
server, they would be able run commands without being authorized. Neverthe-
less, even if that were the case, their actions would be logged, linked to their
authenticated identities.
Moving command authorization from access servers to SCADA servers would
be a solution for this limitation. Nevertheless, it falls out of the scope of this
thesis. It would also reduce the capabilities of access servers and, consequently,
the exibility of the whole architecture.
10.2.4 Additional security considerations
In x5, we established that the protection against replay and delay attacks was a
requirement for our design. In order to full that requisite, our signed messages
include a time stamp and nonce. The former provides the creation time of
the message to the receiver, enabling the rejection of delayed messages and
consequently protecting against delay attacks
On the other hand, the nonce (a random value to be used only once), ensures
that every message sent by the client is dierent to the rest. Therefore it allows
the receiver to identify repeated messages by comparing them with the logged
ones.
An attacker may try to avoid this security measure by sending a command to a
SCADA server dierent from the one that received the message. The potential
impact of this attack depends on the particular distribution of functions per
SCADA server. In any case, attacks would be limited to a particular time win-
dow (i.e. until command requests expire) and would need internal access to the
system, as communications are encrypted node-to-node. Moreover, centralised
log parsing could help to identify message reception patterns potentially related
with replay attacks.
10.3 Performance
The performance evaluation (x9) compared the eciency of the tested crypto-
graphic algorithms (RSA and ECDSA) and the overhead per message of the
implementation. Based on that, this section discusses about which algorithm
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would be more appropriate depending on the particular characteristics of the
target architecture. Moreover, dierent options for domain controller synchro-
nization of public keys are commented, relying on the performance evaluation
results.
Nevertheless, in order to fully evaluate the performance impact of our design in
the target architecture, more parameters should be measured, such as the com-
putational capabilities of the nodes or the properties of ABB RPC protocols.
Since these values vary depending on the particular architecture, measuring the
falls out of the scope of this thesis and our performance evaluation is limited.
However, it provides illustrative results that can be used for assessing the suit-
ability of our solution for a particular target architecture, aiding in the decision
making process.
10.3.1 Cryptographic algorithms
It is important to consider that our comparison is not fair, since the the ECDSA
curve that we are using provides a higher level of security than the RSA key
length set for the evaluation operations. However, our purpose is not to evaluate
these algorithms, but the performance of our application when using them. That
is why we are using those particular parameters, as they were the ones selected
during the implementation.
In any case, our performance evaluation of cryptographic operations produced
results that can be backed up by theory and that are overall similar to broader
performance evaluations of cryptographic algorithms x2.4.3.
Particularly, key generation and signing is faster with ECDSA than with RSA.
On the other hand, signature verication operations are faster with RSA than
with ECDSA.
Key generation Keys are only generated when the user logs in into a work-
station and they last until the session ends or until they expire. Thus, it does
not aect the latency of each message.
As a result, the main implication of key generation is their user experience when
they log in. Should ECDSA be the algorithm of choice, key generation would
be completed in less than a quarter of millisecond in most cases. However, even
when using RSA, the median for key generation time is under 9.5 milliseconds,
less than a tenth of the maximum time for humans to consider an interaction
not to be instantaneous (100 milliseconds) [66].
Moreover, key generation times are practically negligible when operator work-
stations and verifying nodes do not share the same controller. In those cases,
the time since users log in until they are able to log in until they have is aected
by the delay of public key propagation among domain controllers.
Since key propagation times are always above 5 seconds, the dierence between
ECDSA and RSA for key generation would not be appreciable, as this process
represent a very small fraction of the total time needed for the log in operation
to be completed.
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Signature generation and verication Conversely, since each command
sent by the user must be signed, signature generation aects the latency of each
message. Particularly, RSA signature generation is almost three times slower
than its ECDSA counterpart.
On the other hand, RSA is faster performing signature verication than ECDSA.
On average, measurements for this operation with ECDSA were approximately
700 times greater than RSA ones. Other studies of cryptographic algorithms
[7] also show a better performance in signature verication with RSA than with
ECDSA. However, dierences are not as great as in our implementation (RSA
is between 10 and 50 times faster depending on the particular machine running
the tests). Thus, it is likely that our results for ECDSA can be improved by
using a more ecient implementation of its verication algorithm.
Message overhead During the evaluation, the overhead of our solution for
each message has been studied. The size of this overhead varies from 334 to
522 bytes depending on the algorithm in place. These values can be considered
negligible for nowadays the standards (the majority of broadband connections
in Sweden have at least a 100 Mbit/s bandwidth [67]).
In any case, these overhead measurements can be shrunk by using binary based
formats, instead of JSON. This would help not only to reduce the bandwidth
used for message exchange, but also to decrease the processing eort required
for converting the data to and from JSON.
Recommendations Signature generation and verication are the measure-
ments to consider when deciding which algorithm is best in terms of latency
per message, because key generation does not have an eect on every message.
From those results, it is clear that RSA is better than ECDSA, since the dier-
ence between ECDSA and RSA for signature verication is far more signicant
than the variation between those algorithms for signature generation.
Using ECDSA would be appropriate if operator workstations are very lightweight
nodes and its is more convenient for the organization to move computational
intensive operations to servers. Moreover, ECDSA implementation may be im-
proved by using other libraries or more ecient programming languages.
In addition, RSA key material is longer than the one used by ECDSA. Thus, the
size overhead of ECDSA is smaller than that of RSA. Nevertheless, as previously
stated, the overhead can be considered as negligible for modern connections.
Switching to ECDSA for this reason would only be necessary for very bandwidth
constraint connections or in case of limited size elds in the protocols that will
transfer the signature data for each command.
Finally, should vulnerabilities be found in RSA, switching to ECDSA would be
a good alternative for avoiding them and maintaining the security of the system.
10.3.2 Key retrieval delay
When users log in, their keys are uploaded to their AD domain controller.
However, if many controllers are in place, and the verifying node is connected to
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a dierent controller, public keys must be propagated among controllers before
the receiving server can verify messages.
Particularly, if controllers are on the same site, the default synchronization delay
is 15 seconds. However, in the case of controllers in dierent sites, the default
replication time is 180 minutes. It can be reduced in the site link settings, but
the minimum delay is 15 minutes, which is not acceptable for our solution to
work properly.
The USE NOTIFY option reduces this time to 15 seconds, by sending noti-
cations for each modication on the AD to all the controllers on the site link.
Nevertheless, this approach is very coarse-grained (i.e. it triggers a replication
not only for public key eld modications, but for any change on the AD).
Thus, a ner-grained solution has been implemented. It consists in event-
triggered synchronization of the user keys (x8.1.5). When the public key eld
of a user changes, the related AD object is synchronized. In environments with
several controllers, it provides faster replication than the rest of studied options,
performing it in less than 7 seconds. Particularly, replication latency was 6  1
seconds after system boot, which is likely related with modules being loaded into
the system. However, after the initial execution of the synchronization script,
the delay in subsequent runs is reduced to 4  1 seconds.
Both values t ABB requirement for login in times, which establish a maximum
of 10 seconds. Moreover, for guaranteeing the availability of the services they
provide, domain controllers are up most of the time, being boot operations sel-
dom. Therefore, most executions of the event-triggered task would be completed
in approximately 4 seconds.
As a result, should controllers be in dierent logical sites, event-triggered AD
synchronization is clearly the best choice, since replication is only performed
when a public key eld is modied and the delay is lower than with the USE -
NOTIFY parameter. Thus, the logging in latency is lower, and the bandwidth
utilization of the link between sites is also minimized.
Furthermore, event-triggered AD synchronization is also faster than default
replication times between controllers in the same site. As a result, even though
the dierence is not as signicant as with controllers in dierent sites, it could
be benecial to apply this solution in that case, in order to t ABB login delay
requirements.
In summary, if signing and verifying nodes share the same controller, key re-
trieval delay is only dependant on the network delay. Otherwise, the additional
delay produced by AD replication will also aect key retrieval times. Particu-
larly, the minimum retrieval time in that case 4  1.
Since login only happens once for each session, we consider the delay to be ac-
ceptable. The login process is performed at the beginning of the session. Hence,
although it creates a delay for command issuing capabilities to be available to
the operator, it does not interrupt or increment the latency of individual mes-
sages throughout the session.
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11 Conclusion
The aim of this Master thesis was to provide an answer to the following research
question:
What is the best method to provide authentication and accountabil-
ity on the communication between a SCADA server and a remote
operator when an access server is in the middle?
The design proposed in this thesis provides an answer to that question, by
delivering a solution that solves the stated problem. Moreover, two aspects
of the research question were considered: a theoretical view, whose solely focus
was the security of the proposed solution; and a practical view, that additionally
considered other aspects such as cost, latency and compatibility with the target
architecture.
The nal solution simultaneously addresses both aspects of the research ques-
tion. Firstly, it is based on digital signatures, that provide the higher level
of security of all the options considered in the analysis (x6), consequently our
design provides an answer to the research question from a theoretical view. Sec-
ondly, the proposed solution also addresses the practical side of the research
question, since the design has also been evaluated in terms of latency, imple-
mentation cost and compatibility with the existing architecture; guaranteeing
its suitability.
Furthermore, the solution proposed in the design chapter (x7) of this Master
thesis has been validated by creating a prototype implementation (x8) and fulls
the requirements established in x5, in terms of compatibility with the target
architecture, security and performance.
Particularly, a high level of security is achieved by the use of asymmetric cryp-
tography. However, for reducing implementation and management costs, we
do not rely on a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) for credential management.
Conversely, we benet from the presence of Microsoft Active Directory on the
target architecture. We link its identities with the short term public keys that
identify the issuer of each digital signature.
11.1 Future work
The objective of this Master thesis has been met. However, it may be extended
in future work. Particularly, the implementation may be improved by adjusting
it to work on top of ABB RPC protocols. This would allow ABB using our
design in production environments and would provide a more reliable test bed
for performance evaluations.
Moreover, eciency improvements can be applied to the implementation. Firstly,
switching from Python to C/C++ would improve the performance at the verify-
ing node, as stated in x8.3. In addition, moving from JSON to a custom binary
format for exchanging messages between nodes would reduce the bandwidth
used by our solution and improve performance, as JSON parsing operations
would not be needed any more.
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What is more, controller synchronization times when signing and verifying nodes
do not share the same controller have been limited by event triggered synchro-
nization to acceptable values. Nevertheless, further reductions of this delay
would be benecial for the experience provided to the operators when issuing
commands.
Furthermore, an alternative implementation that does not rely on Active Direc-
tory for credential management, but on alternative technology, may be proposed.
For instance, a SQL server could be used for storing public keys. Having an
alternative implementation would broaden the possible target architectures of
our solution, as a Microsoft AD infrastructure would no longer be needed.
In addition, neither RSA nor ECDSA are supposed to be resistant to quantum
computing (x2.4.4). Thus, alternative implementations that rely on quantum-
resistant algorithms (e.g lattice-based or hash-based cryptography) are another
possible extension of this work, as they would make this design valid even if,
due to the development of quantum computing, RSA and ECDSA become vul-
nerable.
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Glossary
Kerberos Network based authentication protocol. It relies on symmetric key
cryptography and the use of encrypted tickets.
nonce Arbitrary number that can only be used once.
RPC Inter-process communation technology that provides location transparency.
Calls to remote procedures can be done as if they where local.
RSA Asymmetric key algorithm for digital signature and encryption.
SCADA Computer based system architecture for management and supervision
of industrial processes.
service user User account that does not represent a user, but a service; pro-
viding a security context for the service execution.
78
Acronyms
AD Active Directory.
ANSI American National Standards Institute.
AS Authentication Server.
BAS Building Automation System.
CA Certication Authority.
CRL Certicate Revocation List.
DCS Distributed Control System.
DoS Denegation of Service.
DSA Digital Signature Algorithm.
ECC Elliptic Curve Cryptography.
ECDSA Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm.
EMS Energy Management System.
ENISA European Union Agency for Network and Information Security.
HMAC keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code.
ICS Industrial Control System.
IED Intelligent Electronic Device.
KDC Key Distribution Center.
LDAP Lightweight Directory Access Protocol.
MAC Message Authentication Code.
MD5 Message Digest 5.
MITM man-in-the-middle.
NIST United States National Institute of Standards and Technology.
NSA United States National Security Agency.
NTLM Microsoft NT LAN Manager.
OCSP Online Certicate Status Protocol.
OID Object IDentier.
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OU Organizational Unit.
PCS Process Control System.
PKI Public Key Infrastructure.
PLC Programmable Logical Controller.
RFC Request For Comments.
RPC Remote Procedure Call.
RSA Rivest, Shamir and Adleman.
RTT Round Trip Time.
RTU Remote Terminal Unit.
SCADA Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition.
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm.
SIS Safety Instrumented System.
SPOF Single Point Of Failure.
SQL Structured Query Language.
TGS Ticket Granting Server.
TGT Ticket Granting Ticket.
WAN Wide Area Network.
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A Installation manual for the Active Directory
Domain Controller
This appendix provides guiding for administrators to set up a domain controller
to work with the solution proposed in this thesis.
Adding a eld for storing operator keys
An Object IDentier (OID) is needed for creating attributes and classes on
the AD schema. They are unique identiers for each element. In our mock
implementation we used a base OID obtained from Microsoft by running the
oidgen.vbs script. This script was obtained from Microsoft's TechNet gallery
and is included with the rest of our implementation.
Furthermore, following a common schema structure, we will have classes under
BaseOID.1 and attributes under BaseOID.2. However, this is by no means
mandatory: any extension schema may be used.
When deploying this solution in a production environment, a dierent base OID
must be used. It may be requested from an ISO member for the owning orga-
nization, as explained in https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/
2008.05.schema.aspx. Should that not be possible, one issued by Microsoft
through the provided script would also be valid.
Once a base OID is available, a eld for storing public keys in the user class must
be added to the Active Directory. A Powershell Script (ADSchemaUserPub-
licKey.ps1 ) for performing that operation is provided. Particularly, it performs
the following actions:
1. It enables AD Schema modications on the domain controller running the
script.
2. It creates an ldif script that:
2.1. Creates an attribute for storing public keys.
2.2. Creates an auxiliary operator class for holding the attribute.
2.3. Sets the created class as auxiliary of the User class.
3. It runs the created ldif script.
The scripts needs some parameters in order to create a custom ldif script,
depending on the naming policies of the organization. Table ?? lists the dierent
parameters accepted by the script.
Setting basic permissions
Once the script has been run correctly, the attribute for storing public keys will
be in the Active Directory schema, belonging to the user class. The name of
the attribute will be prexOperatorPublicKeys. However, the attribute must
have the appropriate permissions, as dened in the design chapter.
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Name Required Description
prex Yes A common prex for the attribute and
class to be created. Custom Active Di-
rectory elements should have a common
prex. Should start with a lower case
letter an written in camelCase.
baseOID Yes The base OID for the organization own-
ing the added elements. It should be
related with the Prex.
publicKeyAttributeOID No (Default: "2.1") The OID for the public Key Attribute.
It is appended to the base OID for iden-
tifying the new element.
operatorClassOID No (Default: "1.1") The OID for the operator class. It is ap-
pended to the base OID for identifying
the new element.
Table 12: Public Keys script parameters
By default, any domain user can read the new eld, but it can only be written
by domain administrators. In order to provide writing permissions for each
user, domain administrators must delegate this privilege to users. The steps for
achieving this are detailed below:
1. Open the Active Directory User and Computers tools. Can be invoked
from the Run Command tool (Windows Key + R), by entering "dsa.msc".
2. Open the Delegation of Control Wizard for the User container that con-
tains the users who need to store their public keys. Figure 17 shows how
to open the wizard for the User container of the test.m domain. The
following nested list details what to do in each step of the wizard:
2.1. Informational text, no action needed.
2.2. User or groups: User SELF must be added to the list, as Figure
18 shows.
2.3. Tasks to Delegate: Select the second option "Create a custom task
to delegate" (Figure 19).
2.4. Active Directory Object Type: Select only the user object (Fig-
ure 20).
2.5. Permissions: Select the Property-specic box on the top list. Then,
on the box, enable the permissions for reading and writing the <Pre-
x>OperatorPublicKeys eld (Figure 21).
2.6. Check that everything in order and press Finish
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Figure 17: Opening the delegation wizard for the User container in the test.m
domain
Figure 18: Delegation of Control Wizard : SELF user added for delegation
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Figure 19: Delegation of Control Wizard : Create a custom task to delegate
Figure 20: Delegation of Control Wizard : Selecting the User object
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Figure 21: Delegation of Control Wizard : Selecting the eld that stores the keys
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Applying ner-grained policies
After the steps covered in the previous section (xA) have been followed, only
the user itself (and domain administrators) would be able to write their own
public key into the Active Directory. Reading permissions are granted to all
authenticated users.
Firstly, a policy that allows some users (service accounts) to read the eld that
stores the public keys must be implemented. It could be done group by group
if more ne-grained policies are needed. However, for simplicity, we are using
the Users container of our domain:
 Open the Active Directory User and Computers tools
 Enable the Advanced Features from the View Menu
 Open the properties of the Users container inside your domain.
 Go to the Security tab and press the Advanced button (Figure 22).
 Add a new rule with the following conguration (Figures 23 and 24):
1. Principal: The group that contains the service accounts which are
authorised to read the keys
2. Type: Allow
3. Applies to: Descendant User objects
4. Only one checkbox must be selected: Read <prex>OperatorPublicKeys
 Press OK and apply the changes
Moreover, for granting reading permissions only to particular users (service
accounts and owner user), a default deny policy must be implemented. It should
block reading requests from every user in the domain (administrators will not
be aected by this policy). As discussed in the implementation chapter (x8),
this policy must be implemented higher element in the AD hierarchy than the
previous rule. Since our mock implementation does not have any OUs, we
implemented the rule domain-wise:
 Still from the Active Directory User and Computers tools (with the Ad-
vanced Features enabled), open the properties for the domain.
 Go to the Security tab and press the Advanced button.
 Add a new rule with the following conguration (Figures 25 and 26):
1. Principal: The group that contains the service accounts which are
authorised to read the keys
2. Type: Allow
3. Applies to: Descendant User objects
4. Two checkboxes must be selected: Read <prex>OperatorPublicKeys
and Write <prex>OperatorPublicKeys. The latter is not strictly
necessary but guarantees security if the schema is changed later.
 Press OK and apply the changes
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Figure 22: Advanced security options the Users container in the test.m domain
87
Figure 23: Users container allow policy
Figure 24: Users container Read thesisOperatorPublicKeys
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Figure 25: test domain container deny policy
Figure 26: test domain read and write thesisOperatorPublicKeys
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Purging obsolete keys
As discussed during the implementation section, expired keys may stay in the
Active Directory if sessions are not closed graciously. In order to address this
issue, the script CleanExpiredPublicKeys.ps1 is provided. When run from a
domain controller, it removes all expired public keys.
In order to automatize the operation, a task can be created with the Windows
Task Scheduler (taskschd.msc), using the creation task Action. The following
parameters are recommended:
 In the General tab, change the user to NT AUTHORITYnSYSTEM (it
can be selected just by writing SYSTEM on the Select User or Group
dialog box)
 In the Triggers tab, add a time based trigger. The frequency can be set
depending on the requirements of the particular deployment
 In the Actions tab, execute the Add new task action:
{ Program/script: powershell
{ Add arguments: -File path to CleanExpiredPublicKeys.ps1
Domain controller replication
As discussed in the implementation chapter, two options have been explored for
dealing with the latency of domain controller replication: Enabling notications
for all changes in the Active Directory and a ner-grained approach based on
the logging of AD write operations.
USE NOTIFY option
This solution for avoiding replication delays only requires the modication of
one parameter. In the Active Directory Sites and Services (dssite.msc), open
the properties for the link that connects your domain controllers (Figure 27).
On the Attribute Editor tab, select the options attribute an set its value to 1
(Figure 28).
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Figure 27: Active Directory Sites and Services IP link
Figure 28: Active Directory Sites and Services: Switching USE NOTIFY on
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Logging based solution
In order to use this solution, auditing must be enabled for write accesses to the
public-key attribute of the user class. Auditing rules can be established from
the Active Directory User and Computers tools (dsa.msc), in the Advanced
Security Settings for the User container.
On the Auditing tab (Figure 29), a new rule must be added with the following
parameters:
1. Principal: Everyone
2. Type: Success
3. Applies to: Descendant User objects
4. Only write thesisOperatorPublicKeys must be selected
Figure 29: Active Directory User and Computers: User container auditing rules
Once the rule is established, write operations on the public-key eld will gen-
erate an event. For acting on that event, the SyncADUserIfKeyUpdated.ps1
script must be stored on a stable location in the domain controller. Then a
task triggered by write access to User objects may be created using the Sync-
TaskGenerator.ps1 script, that accepts three parameters:
1. attributename: The name of the attribute where public keys are stored
in the user objects
2. domainPath: The path of the domain (i.e. "DC=test,DC=m" for do-
main test.m)
3. syncScriptPath: The path of SyncADUserIfKeyUpdated.ps1
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After running SyncTaskGenerator.ps1 the system should automatically perform
a replication of users whose public-key attribute is written.
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